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Even in the West, lawyers have never been loved. As Mozart blamed
an attorney for plotting to prevent Figaro from marrying Susanna, so Or-
son Welles may have blamed the venerable Mr. Thatcher for separating
Charlie Kane from his Rosebud; indeed, Shakespeare would have exe-
cuted the entire profession.' Notwithstanding their alleged venality, law-
yers in the West have done well for themselves. But in Japan, we are told,
they have sunk to their proper station in life. Japan has become in the
American imagination a place where lawyers are few, litigation is rare,
and the bureaucracy governs by developing a national consensus.' What
the Japanese save on legal fees, they use to develop computers, video
games, and Walkmans.
There are indeed few lawyers and lawsuits in Japan. This dearth has
been a mixed blessing, however, for the scarcity of litigation has led to a
substantial under-enforcement of the law. In antitrust, inadequate en-
forcement has resulted in price-fixing cartels and production restraints.
This shortage of lawyers and litigation does not, as commentators have
often suggested, result solely from a "nonlitigious" ethos. There may in-
deed be such an ethos, but it is an ethos buttressed by an array of institu-
tional barriers to litigation that would discourage all but the most persis-
tent plaintiffs in any society.
This Article approaches antitrust law as a case study in the role of
litigation in Japan. It begins by summarizing the role of private litigation
in deterring illegal behavior and describing the relation between cultural
attitudes toward litigation and institutional barriers to the use of the
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courts. It then compares the American and Japanese frameworks for pri-
vate antitrust litigation, and analyzes the various antitrust damage actions
in Japan to date. After outlining the major institutional barriers to such
suits, the Article discusses the implications of these barriers for the distri-
bution of power and wealth in Japanese society. Specifically, it argues
that the barriers have eliminated virtually all deterrents to cartelization in
Japan. More generally, it suggests that the barriers to antitrust suits are
but one example of barriers to litigation that have helped to reinforce a
nonlitigious ethos and have thereby played an important part in assuring
the continued legitimacy of bureaucratic rule.
I. PRIVATE DAMAGE LITIGATION
Many of the misconceptions about Japanese litigation derive from two
assumptions that most Americans bring to the subject: that money spent
on private litigation is a net loss to society, and that the willingness of a
Japanese to sue depends almost entirely on cultural norms regarding liti-
gation. In fact, however, increased private litigation might well result in a
net gain in social welfare, and the Japanese legal structure itself serves to
perpetuate the well known cultural norms toward litigation.
A. The Public Interest in Private Litigation
Private litigation has long served a public purpose in the Anglo-
American tradition. Socially intolerable behavior often gives rise to both a
criminal and a civil cause of action: If picking pockets has been a crime, it
has also been a tort. Traditionally, however, the rationale for the two
causes of action differed. The Crown hanged pickpockets for a public pur-
pose-to stop pickpockets from stealing; the Crown let victims recover the
value of their pocketbooks for a private purpose-to make victims
"whole." Yet the line between deterrence and compensation has been far
from clear. To the extent that the fear of hanging deters pickpockets, com-
pensation becomes irrelevant. To the extent that a victim is likely to re-
cover damages, the tort suit deters pocket-picking.
Deterrence is thus a function not of criminal penalties alone, but rather
of the sum of all public and private sanctions. According to current theory,
the optimal level of deterrence results when the burden to the wrong-doer
of the sanctions for a given act equals the net harm which that act causes
to other members of society, divided by the probability of the wrong-doer's
apprehension and successful prosecution. Of course, considerations like
3. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-13 (1974) (describing model); Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Viola-
tions, 50 U. COH. L. REv. 652, 653-657 (1983) (same); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic
The Yale Law Journal
optimality, the burden of a given sanction, and the harm of a given act
often involve calculations not easily quantified in the real world.
Whatever the difficulties of practical application, however, it is safe to say
that smaller sanctions will in general fail to dissuade wrong-doers from
engaging in conduct that creates a net loss to society, while larger sanc-
tions may induce wrong-doers to refrain even from illegal behavior that
confers a net benefit to society.4
To the extent that the state carries on prosecutorial activities at levels
that produce less than optimal deterrence, private litigation takes on a
public role. The prosecutor's office may be subject to budgetary .restraints
or may decide not to prosecute various crimes for ideological or political
reasons that have nothing to do with the optimal level of law enforce-
ment.' This Article is not the place to discuss what the optimal level of
law enforcement might be if the size of the sanctions could be varied-i.e.,
whether the probability of apprehension should be relatively low and the
fine correspondingly high, or the probability of apprehension high and the
fine low.' Nevertheless, it should be clear that unless a society carries on
sufficent enforcement activities to produce optimal deterrence without pri-
vate litigation, it has a public interest in facilitating private litigation.7
Profit-maximizing victims of illegal behavior will sue, however, only
when the amounts they may recover, multiplied by their probability of
success, exceed their litigation costs. If various barriers to litigation raise
the costs of litigation or make it unlikely that victims will recover the full
amounts of their damages, fewer profit-maximizing victims will sue than
would otherwise. Barriers to litigation can take many forms. They may
increase the victim's litigation expenses, lower the amount of any damage
award, reduce the probability that a victim will prevail in court, or, to the
extent that they diminish the credibility of a victim's threat to sue, lower
the amount of damages a victim will obtain through settlement." As a
result, such barriers can dramatically reduce the role of private parties in
deterring illegal activity.
Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 472 (1980) (same).
4. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 3, at 655 (discussing over- and under-deterrence); Page, supra
note 3, at 472 (same).
5. But see Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 36-38
(1975) (arguing that budgetary constraints may tend to prevent over-enforcement).
6. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169, 180-85
(1968) (detailing optimality conditions); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1979) (offering distinct model of
optimality).
7. Moreover, even the goal of compensation-as opposed to deterrence-is in part a public goal.
8. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 447-48 (2d ed. 1977).
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B. The Cultural Context of Private Litigation
An inquiry into the role of private litigation in Japanese society cannot,
however, proceed on such purely economic terms. Perhaps no concept per-
meates discussions of the Japanese legal system so deeply as the notion
that Japanese do not sue because of a "nonlitigious ethos":9 a supposedly
widely shared and strongly held set of beliefs and attitudes that condemns
recourse to courts as selfish and un-Japanese. Only by understanding this
peculiarly Japanese aversion to suing, we are told, will we understand the
functions that litigation serves in Japan.
1. The Nonlitigious Ethos
The genesis of this ethos is less than clear. Some American and Japa-
nese commentators have explained the ethos as simply a result of the
group- and duty-oriented character of Japanese culture. Unfortunately,
this analysis is more than a bit circular: Explaining the way people act as
a product of their culture while defining their culture as the way they
have learned to act is not, as sociologist Talcott Parsons is said to have
told generations of students, terribly informative.1
Other commentators have adopted a more functionalist approach and
explained that Japanese live in a hierarchical and particularistic society
that functions effectively only by maintaining a high degree of interper-
sonal "harmony."'" Litigation destroys that hierarchical and particularis-
tic harmony, for the universalistic standards used by the courts and the
clear allocation of rights among individuals undermine compromise and
9. For convenience, this essay uses the term "ethos" to refer both to the moral and affective as-
pects of a culture and to its cognitive aspects. One could analyze these two elements separately. Pro-
fessor Clifford Geertz, for example, defines the former as "ethos" and the latter as "world view." C.
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 126-27 (1973). What this essay calls the "non-
litigious ethos" contains dimensions of both ethos and world view: A Japanese individual not only
lives in a world in which to sue is to violate strongly held and widely shared norms, but also employs
a cosmology in which the norms against litigation are essential to social stability and reflect a pecu-
liarly "Japanese" personality. To so dichotomize ethos and world view would introduce a further
dialectic in the analysis of Section I.B. As Geertz points out,
a group's ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life
ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is
rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs
peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life.
Id. at 89-90.
10. See id. at 249-50.
11. Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima has been a pioneering authority on legal sociology in Japan,
and one of the more articulate spokesmen of this thesis. See T. KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HUISHIKI
[THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] (1967); Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contem-
porary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN 41 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963); Kawashima, The Legal Conscious-
ness of Contract in Japan, 7 L. JAPAN I (C. Stevens trans. 1974). For writings by other commenta-
tors, see Noda, Characteristics of Japanese Mentality, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 295 (H.
Tanaka ed. 1976); Shapiro, Can the Japanese Lack of Litigiousness Continue, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 1983, at 25 (E. Lincoln & D. Rosenthal eds. 1983).
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consensus. Because Japanese individuals have internalized the need to
promote group harmony, they choose conciliatory solutions whenever pos-
sible. They hold paramount, in other words, the stability of the relational
networks within which they live.12
Whatever its initial appeal, even this latter analysis obscures more than
it clarifies, for it "explains" a Japanese phenomenon on the basis of cul-
tural peculiarities without tying those peculiarities to the institutional
characteristics that enable them to persist. In American scholarship, the
first systematic analysis of the relation between this "cultural" phenome-
non and the institutional structure of the Japanese legal system appeared
in an article by law professor John Haley.'" Haley notes that Japanese do
in fact "use their courts less frequently than do Americans,"" but argues
that the frequency of litigation does not itself determine whether Japanese
are "litigious." The concept of nonlitigiousness, he explains, is useful only
if it refers to an aversion toward litigation so strong that it induces would-
be plaintiffs "to reach negotiated or mediated settlements that do not re-
flect" the amounts they could recover by suing.15 Haley found no such
willingness to settle for amounts smaller than the probable litigated out-
come discounted by the costs and uncertainties of litigation. He found in-
stead that Japanese litigants sue less frequently because it is simply less
profitable to sue in Japan.
Research in Japan tends to support Haley's argument that the Japa-
nese do not, as a rule, avoid litigation when litigation is financially advan-
tageous. For example, several Japanese scholars have argued that Japa-
nese individuals avoid litigation primarily because of its high costs in
12. One of the more fundamental weaknesses of this analysis is its ambition: It purports to define
a "Japanese" culture and a "Japanese" reaction to differing modes of dispute resolution. However
middle class and urbanized Japan may be, it is not a homogeneous society. Economic disparities,
regional disparities, even substantial linguistic disparities remain. Nevertheless, this essay likewise
assumes that an inquiry into the reaction of most Japanese to litigation can yield profitable general-
izations about Japan as a whole.
13. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). The idea that
disputants in some societies choose for cultural reasons to settle rather than litigate even when litiga-
tion would yield a more favorable net outcome (discounted by the various uncertainties involved) has
been criticized in several ethnographic studies. See, e.g., J. COLLIER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
ZINACANTAN 73, 252-53 (1973) (Mexico); M. MOsER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN A CHINESE
COMMUNITY 184 (1982) (Taiwan); Starr & Yngvesson, Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-in on Com-
promise Decisions, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 553, 554-60 (1975) (criticizing anthropological studies for
undue Durkheimian bias toward harmony); cf. Tanner, Disputing and the Genesis of Legal Princi-
ples: Examples from Minangkabau, 26 Sw. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 375 (1970) (criticizing concept of law
as institutionalization of central norms of society; law instead is often part of social change as dispu-
tants maneuver among various settlement and remedy options).
14. Haley, supra note 13, at 362. Note, however, that the American proclivity to sue has fre-
quently been exaggerated. For example, only 2% of all automobile accident claims in the United
States go to trial. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 434-35.
15. Haley, supra note 13, at 366.
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money and delay and because of its cumbersome procedures.16 Public
opinion surveys, although admittedly somewhat imprecise, support this
argument. In one survey, when asked what factors would most strongly
deter them from litigating a dispute, 64% of the respondents cited high
litigation expenses, and 54% cited court delays-both factors that reflect
dissatisfaction with the workings of the Japanese legal system rather than
aversion to litigation generally. Only much smaller numbers of respon-
dents cited factors that indicated a distaste for litigation: the clear-cut na-
ture of judicial decisions, 26.3%; the risk of an adverse decision, 10.6%;
the inaccuracy of judicial decisions, 9.4%; or the damage to one's reputa-
tion from suing, 6.1%.Y1
2. The Relation of the Ethos to Barriers to Litigation"'
If, as Haley argues, Japanese litigants refrain from litigating only
when they perceive it to be financially advantageous to do so, then the
accessibility of the courts becomes crucial to any discussion of the role of
litigation in Japan. For if Haley is right, then use of the courts will de-
pend primarily on the extent to which individuals think they can effi-
ciently obtain redress through a suit. This perception, in turn, will depend
on the existence of institutional barriers to litigation-factors that increase
the costs of litigation, reduce the probability of a plaintiff's success, or
decrease the amount of any damages a successful plaintiff might recover.
Yet in both the United States and Japan, discussions of barriers to litiga-
tion have been scarce while discussions of the nonlitigious ethos have been
legion.
Although this Article presents the two factors as separate and distinct,
the nonlitigious ethos and the institutional barriers to litigation are mutu-
ally reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. 9 Substantial barriers to
16. See, e.g., Ishii, Nihon: Meiji izen [Pre-Meiji Japan], in HOSHAKAIGAKU KOZA [SYMPOSIUM
ON LEGAL SOCIOLOGY] 257, 258 (T. Kawashima ed. 1973).
17. When asked whether they would sue if they became involved in a controversy, 38.6% of the
respondents replied that they would litigate, while 26.5% said they would not, and 31.6% were unde-
cided. The replies cited in the text were given by the 26.5% who said they would not litigate. H-5,
SAIBAN, BENGOSHI [LAw, LITIGATION, LAWYERS] 76-90 (Osaka Bengoshi Kai ed. 1977); see also
Kawashima, The Status of the Individual in the Notion of Law, Right, and Social Order in Japan, in
THE JAPANESE MIND 262, 272-73 (C. Moore ed. 1967) (similar statistics).
18. This section borrows heavily from P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF REALITY (1966); Berger & Pullberg, Reification and the Sociological Critique of Conscious-
ness, 4 HisT. & THEORY 196 (1965).
19. One might argue that if the Japanese were truly nonlitigious no barriers to litigation would
be necessary-and that the existence of institutional barriers disproves the existence of any nonli-
tigious ethos. The barriers may simply reflect, however, the sanctity which the Japanese governing
elite ascribe to the nonlitigious ethos. The severity of the sanctions that most societies impose for
incest, for example, may reflect not the predilections of the members of those societies toward incest as
much as the severity of the damage that those members believe incest does to the social fabric. But see
S. FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 14-17, 119-125 (J. Strachey trans. 1950) (incest taboo may reflect
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litigation may easily coexist with an orthodox ethos that discourages re-
course to litigation. The relationship between the barriers and the ethos in
such a situation is, however, dialectical. A number of observers have noted
one half of the dialectic: Institutional barriers to litigation reflect the cul-
tural ethos against litigation. All too often, however, the same writers have
failed to appreciate the significance of the other half: The ethos may per-
sist in part because of those barriers to litigation, for the barriers may
remove many of the financial incentives to sue.
The nonlitigious ethos in Japan contains both a normative and a de-
scriptive component. To sue is both to commit an act against the common
good and to behave contrary to the prevailing definition of the Japanese
nature. A would-be litigant lives, in other words, in a world in which
suing is wrong and un-Japanese. Only to varying degrees, of course, have
Japanese internalized this ethical and descriptive formula. As a result,
only as individuals conform their conduct to the formula and repeat it to
others do they preserve its intellectually coercive power-its ability to de-
fine for others what is good and Japanese. As sociologists Peter Berger
and Stanley Pullberg explain, the intellectual world in which one lives
"remains real, in the sense of subjective plausibility . . . only as it is con-
firmed and re-confirmed . . .by others." 20
Barriers to litigation reinforce this nonlitigious ethos by reducing the
financial incentives to heterodoxy. A would-be plaintiff in a case in which
litigation offered a larger net recovery than extra-judicial avenues would
choose between the security of the orthodox ethos and the financial re-
wards of taking his or her claims to court. If the nonlitigious ethos had a
sufficiently precarious place in the Japanese intellectual universe, many
Japanese in such a situation would pick the heretical alternative and sue.
Such a result would not only create whatever instability litigation itself
generates, but would also contribute to the breakdown of the universe in
which litigation is unacceptable and un-Japanese: The larger the number
of Japanese who went to court, the harder each individual would find it to
believe that such conduct was unethical and to define a Japanese as one
who does not sue.21 Institutional barriers to litigation prevent this result
predilections toward incest).
20. Berger & Pullberg, supra note 18, at 201 (italics omitted).
21. Moreover, as recourse to courts becomes more common, the substantive rules of the extra-
judicial fora will themselves change. As extra-judicial fora compete with the courts for clientele, the
results offered by the extra-judicial fora will change to resemble more closely the results obtainable
through litigation. If either litigant can coerce the other into using the courts, after all, an extra-
judicial forum will continue in use only if both litigants believe it grants them at least as favorable a
net recovery as litigation. See, e.g., M. MOSER, supra note 13, at 180-81 (similar observation about
rural Taiwan); Collier, Political Leadership and Legal Change in Zinacantan, 11 L. & Soc'y REV.
131, 132 (1976) (similar observation about rural Mexico); Haley, supra note 13, at 366 (Japan).
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by decreasing the number of situations in which litigation offers a larger
net recovery than settlement.
Examined from this analytic perspective, Haley's article reveals the
precarious nature of the nonlitigious ethos by showing its historically and
culturally tenuous basis. Haley denies that any nonlitigious ethos that ex-
ists today is part of a long-standing historical tradition. Instead, he argues
that it derives from a "conservative reaction to the rising tide of lawsuits
in [the] 1920's and early 1930's and a concern on the part of the gov-
erning elite that litigation was destructive to a hierarchical social order
.. )"22 "The contemporary Japanese belief that they are a traditionally
unlitigious people may reflect," Haley suggests, "a very successful trans-
mission of values and perceptions by those in power in the immediate
prewar years."'23 Demonstrating the fragility of the nonlitigious ethos,
Haley's article implies that without institutional barriers the nonlitigious
ethos would have little compelling power in itself. Without such barriers
the ethos would lose much of its plausibility-and many Japanese would
sue.
This Article examines antitrust damage actions as a case study in the
role of litigation in Japanese society. Judging by the indifference of some
Japanese commentators to cartels, 21 one might argue that a case study in
antitrust is inappropriate. After all, if most Japanese in fact consider anti-
trust violations harmless, Japan may well treat antitrust suits differently
from other types of litigation. One can, however, easily exaggerate the
alleged Japanese tolerance for cartels.2" When the public discovered an oil
industry cartel in the early 1970's, for example, taxi drivers went on
strike and housewives rioted.26 The outcry apparently even threatened to
topple the Japanese government.27 The barriers to antitrust litigation are
not unusual within the Japanese legal system, but rather are representa-
22. Haley, supra note 13, at 373.
23. Id. at 373 n.36.
24. See, e.g., T. IIDA, NIHONTEKI CHIKARAZUYOSA NO SAIHAKKEN [REDISCOVERING THE Dis-
TINCTIVE JAPANESE STRENGTH] 73-97 (1979) (summary of debate); Amaya, Wa no rinri to Dok-
kinhu no rinri [The Ethics of Harmony and the Ethics of the Antimonopoly Act], BUNGEI SHUNJU,
Dec. 1980, at 176 [hereinafter cited as Amaya, Wa no rinri] (Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) perspective); Amaya, Dokkinh'- kaisei shian ni hanron suru [Opposing the An-
timonopoly Act Revision Bill], EKONOMrsuro, Nov. 17, 1974, at 36 [hereinafter cited as Amaya,
Dokkinh'o] (same).
25. See, e.g., T. IIDA, supra note 24, at 73-97 (discussing Amaya thesis); Masamura, Dokkinh-
kaisei to "Nihon teki sang ffijdo" [Antimonopoly Act Revision and "the Peculiar Japanese Indus-
trial Climate"], SHUKAN T6'YV6 KEIZAI, Jan. 18, 1975, at 32 (same); Yasuda, Shirarezaru Dokkinho
to kimy6 na giron [The Unknown Antimonopoly Act and the Strange Argument], BUNGE! SHUNJU,
Jan. 1981, at 420 (same); Symposium, Fuky' taisaku to kyDtD seisaku [Depression Policy and Compe-
tition Policy], 5 KEIZAI H-OGAKKAI NENPO 93 (1984) (discussing impact of cartels on depressed
industries).
26. See infra p. 619.
27. See Tsurumi, Japan, DAEDALUS, Fall 1975, at 113, 122.
The Yale Law Journal
tive of barriers to litigation generally. Indeed, several recent studies sug-
gest that barriers analogous to those described in this Article hinder such
diverse forms of litigation as shareholder derivative suits,2" divorce ac-
tions,29 and environmental suits.30 Ultimately, antitrust may serve not just
as a case study, but as an appropriate metaphor for the concentration of
power in Japanese society-for the full impact of the barriers to antitrust
and other litigation extends beyond the role such barriers play in preserv-
ing the concentration of economic power, to the role they play in legiti-
mating and thereby perpetuating the concentration of political power in
Japan.
II. ANTITRUST DAMAGE SUITS: THE CASES
Cartels produce much the same results in Japan as in the United
States. Some commentators, of course, have claimed that the peculiarities
of Japanese culture transform cartels into a social benefit." ' The Japanese
economy, they argue, is a more "cooperative" endeavor than Western
economies, and cartels merely express this Japanese proclivity for cooper-
ation. Yet an economy is an economy, whether individuals act on oriental
or occidental avarice. An effective price-fixing arrangement necessarily
produces the same results in Japan as elsewhere: It transfers wealth from
purchasers to sellers, increases the price of the cartelized good above its
marginal cost while decreasing its supply and increasing the demand for
its substitutes, and increases the cost of producing the cartelized good.32
The arrangement benefits society only if society at large benefits from
such transfers of wealth and deviations from the competitive norm.
Government-planned cartels aside,33 Japanese cartels are more likely than
28. See Tanaka & Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of Law: A Compar-
ative Study of Japanese and American Law, 7 L. JAPAN 34, 41, 43 (1974).
29. See T. Bryant, Mediation of Divorce and Related Disputes in the Japanese Family Court
System, with Emphasis on the Tokyo Family Court (U.C.L.A. Ph.D. dissertation 1984).
30. See Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environmental
Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Amaya, Wa no rinri, supra note 24, at 176 (cartels benefit Japan); Amaya, Dok-
kinh-o, supra note 24 (same); cf. E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 372 (1970) (Western aversion to
cartels not shared in Japan).
32. Cartels earn rents, decrease allocative efficiency, and decrease technical efficiency. See 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 402b, 405c (1978); Caves & Uekusa, Industrial Organ-
ization, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT 459, 490-508 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976).
33. Some commentators have argued that the Japanese government has been astute enough to
create cartels that do promote the general welfare. See BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, JAPAN IN
1980, at 32-33 (1974); 1. MAGAZINER & T. HouT, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY 52 (1980); cf. C.
JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 17-34 (1982) (defending MITIs role in economy);
E. VOGEL, supra note 2, at 70-78 (same). This essay does not discuss whether the Japanese govern-
ment-or indeed any government-could benefit society at large through cartels. See Note, Trustbust-
ing in Japan: Cartels and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1073 n.42
(1981) (citing various critiques of cartel-oriented policy of Japanese government). Although this essay
analyzes the oil cartel cases in which the government did play a part, the thesis of this essay is based
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Western cartels to benefit society only if Japanese price-fixers as a group
are singularly likely to form cartels that produce socially beneficial trans-
fers and deviations-scarcely a plausible proposition.
In many ways, the Japanese Antimonopoly Act34 reflects this funda-
mental mistrust of cartels. Drafted under the supervision of American au-
thorities in 1947, the Act reflects American economic theory of the time
and prohibits most acts illegal under American antitrust law. 5 At the
point of enforcement, however, American and Japanese antitrust policies
sharply diverge.
A. The Framework for Antitrust Enforcement
1. United States
American antitrust enforcement involves a combination of public and
private litigation. Both the U.S. government and private parties can sue
for equitable relief.3 The government can also sue for criminal sanc-
tions,37 and private parties can sue for treble damages"8 and collect attor-
neys' fees if they win.3 9
Within this framework, private damage actions have played a crucial
role. Because criminal sanctions have been relatively light and haphaz-
ardly applied, and because equitable suits only minimally deter price-
fixing, ° the private damage action has become the primary deterrent to
cartelization. 4 ' The possibility of a damage action deters a would-be
price-fixer by reducing the price-fixer's anticipated payoff by the size of
on the need to deter seller-initiated cartels rather than government-sponsored cartels.
34. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h-ritsu [Law Concerning
the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and the Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947,
translated in H. IYORI & A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 213-64 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Antimonopoly Act]. See generally Note, supra note 33, at 1064-73 (discussion of An-
timonopoly Act).
35. See generally E. HADLEY, supra note 31, at 121-24 (discussion of 1947 act); H. IYORI & A.
UESUGI, supra note 34, at 10-13 (same); Kanazawa, The Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The
Law of Unfair Competition and the Control of Monopoly Power, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 11, at
480, 484-87 (same). Many of the more stringent provisions of the 1947 version of the Antimonopoly
Act, however, were deleted or amended in 1953. Law No. 259 of 1953. For a general discussion of the
1953 amendments, see K. YAMAMURA, ECONOMIC POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN 56-61 (1967); Note,
supra note 33, at 1065-73.
36. See Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982); Clayton Act §§ 15, 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
37. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The government may also bring a damage suit on
its own behalf. See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1982).
38. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
39. See id.
40. Equitable sanctions fail to deter price-fixing because they simply halt illegal activities and do
not cut into profits already made.
41. See Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON.
429, 431 & n.3, 443-44 (1981). The Department of Justice initiates criminal prosecution only in
cases of "undisputed illegality." See P. AREEDA, ANTrTRusT ANALYSIS 152 (3d ed. 1981).
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the potential liability, multiplied by the probability that the victim will
successfully recover. Because the probability of discovery generally in-
creases with the magnitude of the collusive price markup, the availability
of the damage action also lowers the amount by which price-fixers will
raise their prices. The threat of a damage action, in other words, reduces
the size of the most profitable price markup.42
Because damages from a cartel are often widely dispersed, and the cost
of litigating an antitrust claim is high, American law permits class actions
and parens patriae suits.43 These measures allow potential plaintiffs to
pool their litigation costs when private suits would otherwise be unprofita-
ble.44 Were it not for these procedural devices, plaintiffs in many sectors
of the economy would conclude that litigation was simply not worth the
cost.45 In those sectors, the deterrent to price-fixing would virtually
disappear.46
American law also attempts to increase the deterrent value of damage
actions in situations where one victim "passes on" some of the cartel's
damage to other parties. A company that buys a product whose price was
fixed and then either sells that product to others or incorporates that prod-
uct into goods it sells will generally "pass on" part of the price increase to
its buyers.47 As a result, the damages from the cartel will be widely dis-
persed through the various levels of the distribution chain. Because the
extent of the "pass on" will depend on elasticities of supply and demand,
the ultimate incidence of the price increase will be extremely hard to
42. For an algebraic demonstration of this principle, see Block, Nold & Sidak, supra note 41, at
430-33.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions); 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1982) (parens patriae suits). The
deterrent effects of these two remedies differ little.
44. Plaintiffs may also pool their resources by using collateral estoppel offensively. See, e.g., Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (stockholders permitted to invoke collateral estoppel
because of previous S.E.C. litigation); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (determination of patent invalidity gives rise to estoppel claim). Congress has
amended § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), to make clear that collateral estoppel
applies in antitrust actions to the extent it applies elsewhere.
45. To decide whether to litigate a case, potential antitrust plaintiffs necessarily compare the
amount of their claim, multiplied by the probability of success, against their attorneys' fees, multiplied
by the probability of failure. Plaintiffs discount their probable attorneys' fees because they may collect
attorneys' fees if they successfully prosecute their suit. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Note, of course,
that a court may decide not to award successful plaintiffs the entire amount of their actual fees.
46. After conducting an empirical investigation of the bread industry, for example, Block, Nold, &
Sidak conclude that "only after class actions became a credible private remedy did the Antitrust Divi-
sion's enforcement capacity or its filing of a bread price-fixing case deter collusion .... " Block,
Nold & Sidak, supra note 41, at 444.
47. Buyers will "pass on" a portion of their costs unless the market for their product is one in
which supply is perfectly inelastic or demand is perfectly elastic. For a diagrammatic illustration of
this principle, see Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analvsis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 284 (1979).
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prove. This difficulty will in turn dissuade victims of a price-fixing ar-
rangement from suing.48
To deal with this "pass on" problem, American courts have adopted
what has become known as the Illinois Brick-Hanover Shoe49 rule. Under
this rule, courts allow only the party who directly dealt with the price-
fixer to sue, but to sue for the entire amount of the illegal markup. Al-
though the rule deprives indirect purchasers of a cause of action,50 it in-
creases the direct purchasers' recoveries while reducing their litigation
costs. Because a direct purchaser will likely have better access to the infor-
mation necessary to prove the antitrust violation than will an indirect pur-
chaser,5 ' the rule transfers the cause of action to the party generally best
able to litigate successfully. In so doing, it increases the deterrent value of
private damage litigation even though it decreases the number of parties
able to sue.5
2
This framework for antitrust enforcement has not, of course, proven
entirely satisfactory. The penalty under the American framework bears no
resemblance to the optimal antitrust penalty, which would equal the net
economic harm of the cartel to others, including the loss to those not
purchasing a product because of the higher price,5" divided by the
probability of discovery. Perhaps because such a penalty would be too
hard to administer, the American framework allows plaintiffs to sue for
three times the gross overcharge, plus attorneys' fees, and then adds crimi-
nal sanctions. The overcharge is not the primary economic harm of the
cartel, however, for it excludes the loss to those who decided not to
purchase a given product because of the increased price. The multiplier of
three may be appropriate for some activities, but will be too high for eas-
ily detected arrangements and too low for others." And the system fails to
48. The difficulty of proof increases litigation costs and decreases the probability of successful
recovery.
49. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
50. Nevertheless, to the extent that direct purchasers realize that their sellers are charging an
illegal price and anticipate recovering that overcharge, the true marginal cost of the good to the direct
purchasers will be lower-for, in calculating their costs, the purchasers will discount the amount they
pay by the amount they expect to recover in later litigation. Economic theory suggests that the direct
purchasers will make their pricing decisions on the basis of this adjusted marginal cost. To the extent
that they do so, the Illinois Brick-Hanover Shoe rule will result in lower prices to indirect purchasers.
See Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust Laws?
An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U.. CHI. L. REv. 602, 605-06 (1979) (indirect
purchasers are compensated for antitrust injury through lower prices). But see Harris & Sullivan,
supra note 47, at 298-99 n.67 (Illinois Brick rule leads to lowerfixed costs, a windfall that does not
necessarily translate into lower prices).
51. See Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 609-15.
52. For empirical evidence of this proposition, see id. at 625-34.
53. This is the "deadweight loss." See Landes, supra note 3, at 653-57.
54. Cf R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 226 (1976) ("many antitrust violations are so difficult to
conceal that the probability of detection is much greater than one-third").
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coordinate public and private sanctions, even though the appropriateness
of the sanctions levied depends on the sum of all public and private penal-
ties actually imposed.5
2. Japan
Although the Japanese Antimonopoly Act created a Fair Trade Com-
mission (FTC) as an analogue to the Federal Trade Commission and
gave it the power to enforce the Act through criminal and civil sanctions,56
Japanese and American antitrust enforcement could hardly differ more.
While the Antimonopoly Act does provide prison terms for price-fixers, '7
it permits fines of only up to $23,000,"1 and its civil penalties include only
consent decrees, 59 cease-and-desist orders,60 and a surcharge of 0.5 to 2
per cent of a cartel's gross earnings.6" Although the FTC does initiate a
fair number of administrative actions each year to which it generally ob-
tains consent decrees62 and although it regularly sues to recover the
surcharge," neither a consent decree nor the surcharge can significantly
deter price-fixing."" Nevertheless, public antitrust enforcement has pro-
ceeded no further. The FTC has initiated only six criminal prosecutions
in the thirty-seven-year history of the Antimonopoly Act, only two against
cartels.65
55. See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 47, 66-67 (1975).
56. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, §§ 27, 45-70.
57. See id. §§ 89-91.
58. See id. § 89 (5,000,000 yen). Prior to 1977, the maximum fine was one tenth this amount. See
Note, supra note 33, at 1082.
59. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, §§ 48, 53-3.
60. See id. § 54.
61. See id. § 7-2. This provision has been available only since 1977. See Note, supra note 33, at
1081-82.
62. See DOKUSFN KINSHI SEISAKU SANJUNENSHI [A HISTORY OF THIRTY YEARS OF ANrsNONO-
POLY PoLIcY] 656-57 (Kosei Torihiki Iinkai Jimukyoku ed. 1977) (collection of quantitative data)
[hereinafter cited as SANJUNENSHI].
63. See Motonaga, Kachokin seido no genb to d-oko [The Status and Direction of the Surcharge
System], 751 JURISuTo 43, 46 (1981) (quantitative data).
64. See infra pp. 636-37.
65. See Japan v. Idemitsu K7san, K.K., 985 Hanrei jih 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980),
translated in Ramseyer, The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases: Translations and Postscript, 15 L. JAPAN
57, 66 (1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 1108 Hanrei jih 3 (Japan Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 1984);
Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jiho 22 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980), translated in Ram-
seyer, supra, at 57; Japan v. K.K. Miai T-ochi, unreported case (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 29, 1971);
Japan v. Okawa G-mei Kaisha, unreported case dismissed under amnesty proclaimed with the U.S.-
Japan Peace Treaty (Tokyo High Ct., May 12, 1952); Japan v. Yamaichi Shoken, K.K., unreported
case, prosecution withdrawn (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 28, 1951); Japan v. Nbrin Renraku Kyogikai,
unreported case (Tokyo High Ct. April 27, 1951), affd, unreported, (Japan Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1961).
For citation to these cases, see SANJUNENSHI, supra note 62, at 734; Ariga & Rieke, The Antimono-
poly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REV. 437, 477 & n.170 (1964); Kanazawa,
supra note 35, at 486 n.51. Cartels were involved only in Sekiyu Renmei and Idemitsu Klsan. See
SANJUNENSHI, supra note 62, at 734. There have been no criminal prosecutions filed under the An-
timonopoly Act since 1974.
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If public antitrust enforcement has been sparse, private antitrust en-
forcement has been almost nonexistent. Although the Antimonopoly Act
grants the victims of a cartel a strict liability cause of action for actual
damages, 6 the private damage actions brought to date demonstrate the
extent to which private Japanese antitrust litigation is a fiction. Private
parties apparently have filed only seven antitrust damage suits. The plain-
tiffs in two of these cases settled; all others lost. 7 Other than the plaintiffs
who settled,6 8 no plaintiff collected any compensation. No private antitrust
damage claimant has ever prevailed in court in Japan.
In two of the five private damage actions decided by a court, the FTC
had not undertaken administrative actions against the defendants.6" Al-
By contrast, from 1945 to 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal prosecutions in over
350 cases. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 385
(1970).
66. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 25. For a discussion of attorneys' fees, see infra notes
171 & 185.
67. There is, of course, no official count of the number of private antitrust actions filed. See Kai v.
Nippon Sekiyu, K.K., 1005 Hanrei jihf 32 (Tokyo High Ct., July 17, 1981); Okawa v. Matsushita
Denki Sangy-, K.K., 863 Hanrei jih- 20 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 19, 1977); Kato v. Kansai Surippa
SeizU, K.K., 17 Kosei Torihiki linkai shinketsu sh-u 269 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 24, 1958), affd, 17
K-sei Torihiki Iinkai shinketsu shl 274 (Japan Sup. Ct., Sept. 27, 1960); K.K. Kosaka Yakkyoku v.
Taish Seiyaku, K.K., 9 K-sei Torihiki Iinkai shinketsu shu 162 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 19, 1958)
(damages paid in out-of-court settlement); Sato v. Sekiyu Renmei, 997 Hanrei jih- 18 (Yamagata
Dist. Ct., Mar. 31, 1981); Ky-ei Dennetsu K-gy- v. Okabe Maika Kogy-sha, 53 BESSA'sUJURSSuTO
231, 283 HANREI TAIMUZU 324 (Osaka Dist. Ct., June 23, 1972); Takeuchi v. Nippon Sekiyu, K.K.,
unreported case settled out of court, discussed in Toyu saiban nigai wakai [Bitter Settlement in Ker-
osene Trial], Asahi shimbun, July 3, 1981, at 24. See generally Ariga & Rieke, supra note 65, at 477
& n.167 (noting one out-of-court settlement); Kanazawa, supra note 35, at 487 n.54 (same);
Miyamoto, Dokkinh-o to sh6hisha-royu saiban o megutte [The Antimonopoly Act and Consumers: Ex-
amining the Kerosene Trial], IhRITSU JIHo, Sept. 1977, at 78, 79 & n.4; Negishi, Sekiyu karuteru
sh6hisha songai baish- seikyu-jiken Yamagata chisai hanketsu [The Yamagata District Court Decision
in the Oil Cartel Consumers' Damages Case], 741 JURIstrro 94, 94 (1981); Tanaka & Takeuchi,
supra note 28, at 37 n.10 (1974).
Kai and Sar have been appealed. See Suzuki, Keizaih- [Economic Law], H'6RrrsU JIH, Jan.
1982, at 119.
68. K.K. Kosaka Yakkyoku v. Taish- Seiyaku, K.K., 9 K-sei Torihiki Iinkai shinketsu shu 162
(Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 19, 1958); Takeuchi v. Nippon Sekiyu, K.K., unreported case settled out of
court, discussed in Toyu saiban nigai wakai, supra note 67, at 23. The plaintiffs in Takeuchi recov-
ered 4,000,000 yen in attorneys' fees and an additional 5,000,000 yen for a legal aid agency. See Thyu
saiban nigai wakai, supra note 67, at 23.
69. Ky-ei Dennetsu K-gyo v. Okabe Maika Kogy-sha, 53 BESSATSUJURISUTO 231, 283 HANREI
TAIMuZU 324; Kato v. Kansai Surippa Seize, K.K., 17 K-sei Torhiki Iinkai shinketsu sh'! 162.
Neither of these decisions is entirely satisfactory. As explained infra, pp. 623-24, an antitrust viola-
tion is also a compensable tort under MINP0 (CIVIL CODE), Law No. 89 of 1896, § 709, translated
in 4 CODES AND STATUTES OF JAPAN: THE CIVIL CODE (1949), and a § 709 suit need not follow an
FTC decision. The plaintiffs in Kansai Surippa apparently did not specify whether they were suing
under Antimonopoly Act § 25 or MINPA § 709, but they did sue in Tokyo High Court-which has
original jurisdiction over § 25 suits but not § 709 suits. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 85(ii).
Thus, if the plaintiffs did not have a § 25 claim, the court arguably should have removed the case to a
district court to hear the potential § 709 claim. See MINJI SOSHO HO (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE),
Law No. 29 of 1890, translated in THE [JAPANESE] CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 30 (1950).
On the other hand, the plaintiff in Kroei Dennetsu sued in the Osaka District Court, which has
jurisdiction over a § 709 but not a § 25 claim. Without considering whether the plaintiffs had a § 709
claim, however, the court dismissed the suit on the grounds that a § 25 claim does not lie where the
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though the Antimonopoly Act authorizes private actions,"0 a plaintiff may
sue under the Act only if the FTC has issued a final administrative order
against the defendant.71 In neither of these cases had the FTC issued a
final order. Thus, the courts faced the issue of antitrust liability only in
three cases: Kai v. Nippon Sekiyu, K.K.,72 Sato v. Sekiyu Renmei, 3 and
Okawa v. Matsushita Denki Sangy-, K.K.74
B. Kai v. Nippon Sekiyu, K.K.
Kai involved a kerosene price-fixing cartel. Fourteen distributors had
controlled the entire kerosene market in Japan in the early 1970's.7 5
Twelve of the fourteen met secretly to try to raise prices, while the other
two distributors, the Exxon and Mobil distribution subsidiaries, excused
themselves from the meetings to protect themselves from American anti-
trust sanctions.16 Because the Exxon and Mobil subsidiaries followed the
cartel's pricing policies even though they did not attend the meetings,7 the
cartel seemed likely to succeed. The distributors reinforced their scheme
by restricting refining operations through their trade association.7 8 And, as
if to obtain legal sanction for their plans, they consulted repeatedly with
the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and
obtained its acquiescence. 7 9 The major foreign oil producers would have
posed the strongest threat to the distribution cartel, for they could have
by-passed the refining restrictions and entered the Japanese market with
goods produced abroad. To do so, however, they would have had to create
new distribution networks. The Shell and Getty subsidiaries joined the
FTC has not issued a final decision. Cf Tanabe, The Processes of Litigation: An Experiment with the
Adversary System, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 11, at 73, 85-96 (discussion of power of a Japanese
judge to remedy errors made by the parties). See generally Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 79 n.4
(criticizing cases discussed above); Case Comment, 53 BESSATSU JURISt-ro 231, 232 (1977) (same).
70. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 25.
71. See id. § 26.
72. 1005 Hanrei jih- 32 (Tokyo High Ct., July 17, 1981).
73. 997 Hanrei jih- 18 (Yamagata Dist. Ct., Mar. 31, 1981).
74. 863 Hanrei jih- 20 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 19, 1977).
75. See Kai v. Nippon Sekiyu, K.K., 1005 Hanrei jih- at 61.
76. See Tsurumi, supra note 27, at 113, 120. But see Idemitsu Kosan, 1108 Hanrei jiho, at 12
(Exxon and Mobil subsidiaries feared Japanese FTC).
77. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jihb at 61; Tsurumi, supra note 27, at 120.
78. See Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jih- 22 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980).
79. MITI's involvement was apparently part of an ongoing and widespread program of "adminis-
trative guidance" in the oil industry. Administrative guidance has been widely discussed in the En-
glish-language press, and need not be explained here. See, e.g., C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at
265-72 (administrative guidance and MITI); Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance:
Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 923
nn.1-2 (1984) (collecting sources of discussion). A major issue in the oil cartel cases was whether
MITI's administrative guidance excused the oil firms and trade association of civil and criminal lia-
bility. See Ramseyer, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement After the Oil Embargo, 31 AM. J. COMP. L.
395, 400-08, 419-20 (1983).
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cartel,8" and the Mobil and Exxon subsidiaries followed its lead.8
Whatever foreign threat might have existed thus failed to materialize.82
Nevertheless, for price-fixers the early 1970's were not the best of
times. After the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil producers
slashed their sales to Japan. This economic threat terrified the Japanese
public, and the price increases that followed made the public acutely in-
terested in why the market functioned as it did. Taxi drivers struck over a
shortage of liquified petroleum gas; housewives rioted over a kerosene
shortage.83 The FTC had always had a stronger interest than the rest of
the Japanese bureaucracy in enforcing the Antimonopoly Act, and saw
this period of public discontent as a chance to assert its authority. Under
aggressive new leadership,"' it raided the offices of the oil companies.85
The Commission then began the first Japanese criminal prosecutions for
cartelization, charging the petroleum firms and trade association with An-
timonopoly Act violations in what would become the most notorious anti-
trust investigation in Japanese history. The public cheered.86
In 1980, the trial court in these criminal cases held that the oil cartel
had been illegal despite MITI's acquiescence. 87 It acquitted the trade as-
80. The Shell subsidiary, Sheru Sekiyu, K.K., and the Getty subsidiary, Mitsubishi Sekiyu, K.K.,
see JAPAN PETROLEUM & ENERGY YEARBOOK-1978, at G-5 (Japan Petroleum Consultants, Ltd.
ed. 1978) (shareholding arrangements), were members of the cartel.
81. See supra p. 618.
82. Of course, the threat of competition from abroad may have prevented the cartel from raising
prices above market levels. The Kai court held that the cartel prices were below market levels, but
because of government intervention rather than the threat of competition. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jih5,
at 77. If the court was correct, no foreign firm would have had an incentive to enter the market.
This Article does not attempt to evaluate the empirical economic evidence on pricing in the Japa-
nese oil industry.
83. See C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 298. Many taxis in Japan use liquified petroleum gas
rather than gasoline.
84. Toshihide Takahashi became Commissioner in 1972, see SANJUNENSHI, supra note 62, at v,
and undertook to enforce the Antimonopoly Act far more stringently than his predecessors. See C.
JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 298-99.
85. See C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 299; Smith, Prices and Petroleum in Japan:
1973-1974-A Study of Administrative Guidance, 10 L. JAPAN 81, 98 (1977).
86. See Tsurumi, supra note 27, at 122-23. Indeed, the members of a major consumer group, the
"Housewives' Federation," repeatedly shouted "banzai" on hearing of the indictments. See C. JOHN-
SON, supra note 33, at 300.
87. Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K., 985 Hanrei jih5 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980), trans-
lated in Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 66, 70-72, affld in part and rev'd in part, 1108 Hanrei jilTo 3
(Japan Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 1984); Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jih- 22 (Tokyo High Ct.,
Sept. 26, 1980), translated in Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 57, 60-63, 65-66.
The English-language material on these criminal cases includes Haley, The Oil Cartel Cases: The
End of An Era, 15 L. JAPAN 1 (1982); Matsushita, Problems and Analysis of the Oil Cartel Case
Decisions (J. Sameth trans.), 15 L. JAPAN 79 (1982); Ramseyer, supra note 79; Ramseyer, supra
note 65; Repeta, The Limits of Administrative Authority in Japan: The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases
and the Reaction of MITI and the FTC, 15 L. JAPAN 24 (1982); Sanekata, Administrative Guidance
and the Antimonopoly Law-Another View of the Oil Cartel Criminal Decisions, 15 L. JAPAN 95
(1982); Smith, supra note 85; Note, supra note 33. Japanese-language materials on these criminal
cases are cited in Appendix to Symposium: The Oil Cartel Cases, 15 L. JAPAN 99-101 (1982).
The antitrust litigation in the oil industry involved four separate sets of suits, each of which is
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sociation and its officials on the grounds that, because of MITI's role, the
officials had not been conscious of the illegality of their actions. Neverthe-
less, it convicted most of the oil companies and their executives. Because
the executives had first fixed prices on their own initiative and only later
sought MITI's imprimatur, the court believed the executives knew they
were violating the law. They appealed, but to no avail. In 1984, the Japa-
nese Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of all but three of the
defendants."8
The judgment in Kai was rendered soon after these criminal case deci-
sions. The Kai plaintiffs had sued six of the distributors" for price-fixing
under the private damage provisions of the Antimonopoly Act.90 Proving
the antitrust violation was not hard. Although Japanese law lacks any
provision making a judgment in a prior government antitrust suit prima
facie evidence of a violation,91 it also lacks juries.92 Not only did the
judges in Kai know what the trial court had held in the criminal cases,
but Kai and the criminal cases were all tried in the Tokyo High Court.93
As one might expect in the wake of the criminal decisions, the court in
Kai found that the defendants had fixed prices and violated the An-
timonopoly Act.9
4
summarized in Ramseyer, supra note 65, at 73-78.
88. Japan v. Idemitsu K7san, K.K., 1108 Hanrei jih- 3 (Japan Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 1984). For
commentaries on this decision, see Hatakeyama, Sekiyu karuteru hanketsu to gVosei shidto [The Oil
Cartel Decision and Administrative Guidance], 813 Juistrro 6 (1984); Hayashi, Sekiyu karuteru
no keiji sekinin [The Criminal Responsibility of the Oil Cartel], 813 JUR1SUTO 10 (1984); Kitani,
Sekiyu karuteru (kakaku kyFtei) jikin Pkokushin hanketsu ni tsuite [Regarding the Appellate Decision
in the Oil Cartel Price-fixing Case], 813 JURISUTO 17 (1984). For commentary on the decision in an
official government journal, see Hayashi, Gy-,sei shid'o ni yoru jigyosha no karuteru k-oi to Dokusen
kinshi h-o no kankei ni tsuite no Saikosai no shinhanrei [Recent Supreme Court Decision Regarding
Relation Between Antimonopoly Act and Cartelization by Business Pursuant to Administrative Guid-
ance], 1223 TOKI NO HURE 54, 1224 TOKI NO HOREi 53, 1225 TOKI NO HOREI 52 (1984).
89. The plaintiffs sued under Antimonopoly Act § 25, which allows suits only after a final FTC
administrative decision. Six of the twelve members of the cartel had contested in court the FTC action
against the cartel. See Idemitsu Kosan, K.K. v. K7sei Torihiki Iinkai, 32 Sai-han minshu 533 (Tokyo
High Ct., Sept. 29, 1975), affid, 32 Sai-han minsht! 515 (Japan Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1978); Ramseyer,
supra note 65, at 74. To avoid the argument that the FTC action against those six was not final, the
plaintiffs sued only the six who did not contest the FTC decision. See Miyamoto, supra note 67, at
81.
90. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 25.
91. Compare Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34 (no provision giving weight to prior judgment in
suit brought by government), with Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982) (final judgment in
suit brought by government is prima fade evidence against defendants in subsequent private action).
See also Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28, at 44 (judgment against defendant in government suit is
not evidence of violation in subsequent suit by private citizen). But see Miyamoto, supra note 67, at
82-83 (prior judgment may have considerable probative value despite absence of collateral estoppel).
92. For a historical discussion of the Japanese use of the jury system, see the materials collected in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 482-91.
93. The Tokyo High Court, although generally an appellate court, has original jurisdiction over
both antitrust criminal cases and damage suits brought under § 25 of the Antimonopoly Act. See
Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 85. Kai involved a different panel of judges than the criminal
cases.
94. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jih- at 71-72.
Barriers to Litigation in Japan
The plaintiffs in Kai lost, however, for failure to prove their damages.
The court's holding results from two analytic decisions it made: First, ac-
cepting the defendants' price discrimination scheme as effective, it ignored
price increases in the kerosene allegedly sold exclusively to industrial
users, and second, it calculated the plaintiffs' damages as only the differ-
ence between the cartel price and a hypothetical market price-even
though it believed that the distributors had been selling kerosene at a
below-market price prior to the cartel.
1. Price Discrimination
At the time of the cartel, the distributors had separately marketed two
products, consumer-use kerosene and industrial-use kerosene. The two
products were, however, identical. The different labels merely reflected
the distributors' response to pressure from MITI to price-discriminate
and charge higher prices to large-scale industrial users. 5
The distributors apparently restricted the availability of the lower-
priced consumer-use kerosene and sold the remainder as the higher-priced
industrial-use product. 6 Yet the opinion gives no indication that the dis-
tribution channels for the two products were such that the distributors
could have raised prices to industrial users without affecting consumer
prices. Indeed, the plaintiffs testified that some retailers told them they
could have kerosene only if they purchased it at industrial-use prices."
Nevertheless, the court apparently believed that the sellers were generally
able to keep the two distribution channels distinct.9" The court further
asserted that even if the higher industrial-use prices did in fact induce
some dealers to repackage consumer-use kerosene as industrial-use, such
actions were not the result of the cartel.99
Because it determined that the increases in the price of industrial-use
kerosene did not result in higher prices to the plaintiffs, the court held
that the plaintiffs could have been affected by only two of the five price
agreements in 1973, those increasing the price of consumer-use ker-
95. See id. at 65; Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 87; Shoda, T'1yu saiban no hanketsu o meguru
mondaiten: ka [Issues in the Kerosene Trial Decision: Part II], 776 JURISutro 115, 115 (1982).
96. The distributors sold only 70% to 80% of the kerosene as consumer-use kerosene. See Kai,
1005 Hanrei jih- at 73-74.
As a form of price discrimination, this arrangement was a crude scheme. Price discrimination is
difficult to enforce. In general, a seller can successfully charge different prices to two groups of users
only if one group in fact values the product more highly than the other, the seller can prevent buyers
who value the product more highly from purchasing the product at the lower price, and the seller can
estimate accurately the quantity demanded by each group. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 17-18 (1982).
97. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jih- at 74.
98. See id. at 65. But see Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 87 (arguing that channels were not dis-
tinct); Sh-da, supra note 95, at 115 (same).
99. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jihU at 74.
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osene.' 00 Those two agreements together increased kerosene prices by a
mere 1.5 cents per gallon. 0 By ignoring the increases in the price of
industrial-use kerosene, the court effectively insured that the plaintiffs
would recover at most an insignificant amount.
2. Damage Formula
By misapplying the standard damage formula, the court destroyed any
remaining chance of recovery. The court held the plaintiffs entitled to the
difference between the market price of kerosene and the cartel price. 102
Under competitive circumstances, that formula would of course yield the
correct result. The oil industry, however, had been under MITI's supervi-
sion for several years, and the court believed that MITI had kept kerosene
prices below market levels.105 The court noted that although freight and
crude oil costs had risen, the demand for kerosene had increased. 0 As a
result, the court believed that kerosene prices had remained below the hy-
pothetical market prices even after the defendants' price-fixing efforts.105
Although kerosene prices were higher during the cartel than they had
been before, they remained lower than they would have been had prices
been determined by market forces. As a result, the court held, the plain-
tiffs had suffered no injury.
The court did not arrive at this somewhat peculiar conclusion for lack
of an alternative. The FTC, for example, had urged the court to measure
the plaintiffs' damages as the difference between the cartel price and the
pre-cartel price.10 6 Although that difference would not represent a cartel's
overcharge in a market economy in flux, it might well represent that over-
charge in a market subject, as the court believed to be the case in Kai, to
government price controls. After all, if the pre-cartel kerosene price were
indeed a controlled price, then it would have approximated kerosene
prices in the absence of the cartel. The difference between that price and
100. The court held that the defendants had fixed prices on five occasions in 1973-January,
February, August, October, and December-but that the price of consumer-use kerosene was involved
only in the price increases of August and October. See id. at 61-67.
101. The August increase was 1,000 yen per kiloliter, or approximately 1.5 cents per gallon, id.
at 74-75. The court believed that the October increase was merely an effort to enforce the August
increases without raising prices further. See id. at 66, 74-75.
102. See id. at 75.
103. See id. (beginning April, 1971, MITI engaged in administrative guidance to restrain in-
creases in price of kerosene).
104. See id. at 76-77; Shda, supra note 95, at 116.
105. See Kai, 1005 Hanrei jih at 77.
106. See id. at 81-88 (FTC opinion on damages); Kikuchi, Dokusen kinshi h-5 ihan lzisha no
minji sekinin: ka [The Civil Liability of Antimnopoly Act Violators: Part II], 270 NBL 32, 38; Cf
Sh-da, Kakaku karuteru ni yoru higai to songai baiskro [Damage Compensation and the Damages
Caused by a Cartel], 699 JURISUTo 101, 104-05 (1979) (suggesting similar measure of damages).
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the cartel price would then have represented the plaintiffs' damages.'
This approach, however, was one the court rejected.
C. Sat- v. Sekiyu Renmei
The claims of the Sato- plaintiffs arose from the same activities in the oil
industry as the claims in Kai and had two parts: price-fixing allegations
against the distributors and production-limitation allegations against the
trade association. Unlike the Kai plaintiffs, however, the plaintiffs in Satr
did not sue under the Antimonopoly Act. Instead, they argued that an
antitrust violation was an intentional tort and sued the kerosene distribu-
tors under the general tort damage provisions of the Civil Code. 8 The
Japanese Supreme Court had suggested such a theory in 1972,109 but this
was the first case in which a plaintiff had relied on the argument. The
plaintiffs had three reasons to sue under a tort theory: They could sue
those firms against whom the FTC had not issued a final administrative
decision; they could sue the petroleum trade association as well as the
distributors; and they could sue in local court. Under the Antimonopoly
Act, they could have sued only those firms subject to final administrative
actions," 0 only private firms,"' and only in Tokyo High Court." 2 Under
the Antimonopoly Act, however, the plaintiffs would have had a strict
liability cause of action."' Because they sued under general tort princi-
107. Instead, the court's formula effectively eliminates private damage actions in those sectors of
the economy where the government has maintained below-market prices. Perhaps the only way to
justify the court's approach is to recognize MITI's efforts to control prices as illegal-as the Tokyo
High Court seemed to suggest in the criminal case. See Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jihc at 58-59. If
MITI's instructions were illegal, then the pre-cartel price resulted from illegal activities. If the defen-
dants colluded to raise that price to market levels, they merely eliminated the consequences of those
illegal actions. The Kai court eliminated this justification for its formula, however, by suggesting that
MITI's price activities were legal. See 1005 Hanrei jih- at 72; see also Idemitsu Kbsan, 1108 Hanrei
jihu at 13-14 (MITI's activities declared legal).
108. MINP0 § 709: "A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is
bound to make compensation for damages arising therefrom."
109. See Ebisu Shokuhin Kigy- Kumiai v. Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, 26 Sai-han minshu- 1573, 1576
(Japan Sup. Ct., Nov. 16, 1972); Tanihara, Case Comment, 1013 Hanrei jih- 170, 171-72 (1981).
110. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 26. Apparently because of such considerations, the
Kai plaintiffs sued only six of the twelve cartel members. Japanese tort law, however, has tradition-
ally provided for joint and several liability. MINPO §§ 432, 719; K. TAKANASHI, MINP'O [CIVIL
CODE] 190, 192, 276 (1965). If the Antimonopoly Act were governed by the same principle, the Kai
plaintiffs could have recovered their entire damages from the six defendants. The Antimonopoly Act
does not discuss joint and several liability and no case to date has addressed the issue. Note that the
tort law regarding joint and several liability is currently in flux. See 3 K. IGARASHI, H. END5, T.
KAWAI & 1. SHIMAZU, MINPO GAKU NO KISO CHISHIKI [BAsIC KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL CODE STUD-
iEs] § 9-82 (1975); Kanchiku, Kfodofuh ki no seiritsu han'i [The Prerequisites forJoint LiabilityJ,
515 HANREI TAIMUzU 65, 65 (1984); Case Comment, H'oRrISU JIHo, Jan. 1983, at 59.
111. Section 25 of the Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, does not authorize suits against trade
associations. See Shuda, supra note 106, at 105 (discussing lack of Antimonopoly Act cause of action
against trade associations).
112. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 85.
113. See id. § 25.
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ples, the Sat- plaintiffs needed to prove either negligence or
intentionality." 4
The plaintiffs in Sat- had little trouble proving that the defendants had
acted illegally and intentionally.1 5 By the time the Satf- court decided the
case, the Tokyo High Court had already convicted the petroleum firms of
price-fixing," 6 and the Sato- court borrowed the High Court's analysis of
illegality." 7 Moreover, because the plaintiffs proved that the defendants
had realized their acts would produce the consequences of which the
plaintiffs complained, the court held that the plaintiffs had proven in-
tent."' A lack of consciousness of illegality may preclude a finding of
criminal intent, 9 but it was no defense in Sato- to a tort action.120
1. Price-fixing
The price-fixing aspect of the Sat- decision was every bit as senseless as
that in Kai. Like the Kai court, the Sat- court ignored the price increases
in industrial-use kerosene. 2 and concluded that only two of the price in-
creases in 1973 could have damaged the plaintiffs. 22 Ultimately, however,
the plaintiffs in Sat- lost their price-fixing claim because the court be-
lieved they failed to show the causal link between the defendants' price-
fixing activities and their damages.
The causation issue in Sat- was essentially a "pass on" problem. The
Sat- court noted that, before reaching the consumer, the kerosene sold by
the distributors sometimes passed through as many as four separate sell-
114. MINPO § 709.
115. Sate, 997 Hanrei jihU, at 83-84.
Note that some scholars in Japan have argued that price-fixing is a question of negligence rather
than intent. See Okujima, Tsuruoka toyu hanketsu no mondaisei [The Problematic Character of the
Tsuruoka Kerosene Decision], 443 HANRE TAIMUZU 6, 7-8 (1981); Shrda, Antimonopoly Law Viola-
tion and Compensatory Damages, 16 L. JAPAN 1, 8 (1983); Shda, Dokkinho jo no shinketsu to
songai baish [Damage Compensation and [Administrative] Decisions Based on the Antimonopoly
Act], 607 JURIstrro 117, 119 (1976). See Case Comment, 53 BFSSATSU JURISUTo 231, 232 (1977)
(following Sh-da).
116. See Idemitsu K-san, 985 Hanrei jih3 at 17-44. The court also held that the Petroleum
Federation had violated the law, but acquitted it on the grounds that its officials had not been con-
scious of the illegality of their actions. See Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jih3 at 57-66.
117. The discussion of illegality in Sate, 997 Hanrei Jih at 75, is apparently based on the analy-
sis of the issue in Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei Jiho at 58-59, though the Sato court makes several
errors not found in Sekiyu Renmei. See Ramseyer, supra note 79, at 420 nn.175 & 176.
118. See Sato, 997 Hanrei jih at 84; Negishi, supra note 67, at 98; Tanihara, supra note 109, at
173.
119. See Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanrei jih at 60-66. For a fuller discussion of the relation between
criminal intent and consciousness of illegality, see Ramseyer, supra note 79, at 400 n.33, 404-05.
120. See Sato, 997 Hanrei jih- at 84; Negishi, supra note 67, at 98.
121. See Sat, 997 Hanrei jihr at 76-80, 87.
122. It found that plaintiffs were damaged only by the August and October increases. See id. at
78-79. Moreover, like the Kai court, the Sato- court believed that the October price increase was
merely a consolidation of the August increase. See Sato, 997 Hanrei jih at 82.
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ers, each of whom might absorb a portion of a price increase.'23 The court
did find that the defendants had successfully fixed their prices.,"" It even
held that these increases had led to higher prices being charged to the
plaintiffs' sellers.1 25 It denied the plaintiffs' claims, however, on the
ground that the plaintiffs' sellers had not raised the prices they charged.
The plaintiffs had, in other words, successfully proven that the cartel's
price increases had travelled the entire distribution chain-except the last
link.
The analysis by which the court concluded that the plaintiffs' sellers
had not raised their prices is a peculiar one indeed. The plaintiffs had
bought most of their kerosene from a cooperative, but failed to name it as
a party plaintiff. The court treated this cooperative as a third-party seller
rather than as the plaintiffs' purchasing agent. This distinction was cru-
cial. It meant that the plaintiffs would have to prove that the cooperative
had raised the prices it charged its members.1 26 As a service to those mem-
bers, however, the cooperative had consistently sold kerosene at below-
market prices and did not significantly increase its kerosene prices in late
1973 or early 1974. 12 7 Instead, because it charged low prices, it found
itself with a kerosene shortage. 12 These facts suggest that the plaintiffs
suffered two forms of injury: First, the kerosene shortage at the coopera-
tive forced them to buy kerosene from other sellers at higher, cartel-caused
prices, and second, as members and therefore presumably owners of the
cooperative they lost profits because the cooperative absorbed the cartel's
higher prices. The court rejected the first possible injury on grounds of
inadequate proof;129 the second it did not even discuss.
2. Production Restrictions
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the trade association
had raised consumer prices by restricting kerosene production. Again, the
problem involved the extent of the "pass on." The court pointed to other
factors-such as the increased industrial demand for kerosene, the abnor-
mally cold winter, increased delivery costs, and various transportation dif-
ficulties-all of which might have contributed to the higher prices. There
simply was insufficient proof, it held, that the association's restrictions,
123. See Sato, 997 Hanrei jih3 at 85-86.
124. See id. at 87.
125. See id. at 88.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 89, 90.
128. See id. at 89.
129. See id.
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rather than these factors, had caused whatever kerosene price increases
there might have been."' 0
D. Okawa v. Matsushita Denki SangyU, K.K.
The only other antitrust damage action decided on the merits was a
resale price maintenance suit by consumers against a television manufac-
turer: Jkawa v. Matsushita Denki Sangyo, K.K."'3 Although resale price
maintenance analytically bears little relation to cartelization, the court's
disposition of Matsushita Denki closely resembles the opinions in Kai and
Sat-. The plaintiffs in Matsushita Denki argued that the manufacturer
had sold its products only to wholesalers who dealt exclusively in Matsu-
shita Denki products, had instructed those wholesalers to boycott retailers
who sold Matsushita Denki products at heavily discounted prices, and had
instructed the wholesalers to sell its products to retailers only at specified
prices.13
Despite its belief that Matsushita Denki had indeed engaged in resale
price maintenance and raised consumer prices, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' claims on the ground that they had failed to prove the extent of
their damages.' The court defined the plaintiffs' damages as the differ-
130. See id. at 86-87, 89-90.
131. 863 Hanrei jih 20 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 19, 1977). Matsushita Denki produces electrical
appliances sold under such names as National, Panasonic, Quasar, and Technics.
132. Id. at 21-22; see Negishi, Case Comment, 900 Hanrei jih'o 143, 143 (1978).
Where retailers pressure a manufacturer to introduce a resale price maintenance scheme, the ar-
rangement may represent an attempt by retailers to enforce a horizontal price-fixing agreement. E.
GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 257 (2d ed. 1981). The Matsushita
Denki plaintiffs alleged nothing of the sort, however, and true resale price maintenance is virtually
self-policing since it runs counter to a manufacturer's basic interests. See Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav. 6, 22-23 (1981).
But see Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1862-63
& n.171 (1984) (resale price maintenance might produce monopoly gain). If retailers reduce their
prices, they will sell more products-and if a manufacturer has not cut his wholesale price, he will
simply make a proportionately larger profit. Resale price maintenance thus serves a manufacturer's
interests only if the minimum price induces retailers to compete on non-price terms like advertising
and service and thereby increase the total sales of the manufacturer's goods.
In the absence of dealer pressure to maintain prices, Matsushita Denki's efforts probably repre-
sented such an effort to encourage its dealers to promote and service its products. Nevertheless, resale
price maintenance agreements appear generally to be illegal in Japan, except as so designated by the
FTC. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, §§ 2(1), 19, 24-2, 25. As such, they represent conduct for
which a consumer may sue for damages under the Antimonopoly Act. See generally 2 A. SHDA,
DoxusFN KINSHI if KENKYU [STUDIES IN THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT] 187-97 (1976); Covey, Verti-
cal Restraints Under Japanese Law: The Antimonopoly Law Study Group Report, 14 L. JAPAN 49,
62 (1981); Haley, Marketing and Antitrust in Japan, 2 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 51,
62-65 (1979); Negishi, Saihanbai kakaku iji [Resale Price Maintenance], in DOKUSEN KINSHI HO 0
MANABU [LEARNING THE ANTIMONOPOLY AT] 168-76 (A. Shoda & K. Sanekata eds. 1976); Tsuji,
Regulation of Resale Price-Maintenance in Japan, 18 N.Y.L.F. 397 (1972).
133. Matsushita Denki, 863 Hanrei jiho at 28-30. But see Negishi, supra note 132, at 148-49
(arguing that it is unclear whether the Matsushita Denki court failed to find damages or failed to find
causation).
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ence between the actual retail price and the market price,13 4 and held that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove the latter. Yet the plaintiffs could hardly
have proffered much more proof than they did. The market price is by
definition a fictitious price. In order to suggest what that price would have
been in the absence of a price maintenance scheme, the plaintiffs proved
the price for Matsushita Denki television receivers among wholesalers not
exclusively dealing in Matsushita Denki products and the price of the
receivers at various discount outlets.3 5
The court was not satisfied. It noted that the price among the non-
Matsushita Denki wholesalers was apparently a composite price of prod-
ucts that included receivers sold by cash-short and bankrupt retailers. 3 6 It
considered the prices charged by the discount houses to be a poor index,
since the discount houses bought their sets on this wholesale market and
operated at a smaller retail markup than could the local stores from which
the plaintiffs had purchased their receivers. 37 Given the hypothetical
character of the "market" price for the receivers, however, there was little
other evidence the plaintiffs could have offered.' 38
III. ANTITRUST DAMAGE SUITS: THE BARRIERS
This, then, is the extent of antitrust damage litigation in Japan: two
cases settled out of court, two cases dismissed for lack of a final FTC
disposition, and Kai, Sato, and Matsushita Denki. Of course, some price-
fixers may have "bought off" potential plaintiffs before suit.1'3 If such
settlements were common, they would themselves deter price-fixing.
Nevertheless, seven is a small number of claims even if one allows for
unrecorded settlements.' 4 And to the extent that litigation is an unrealis-
tic option, a cartel's victims will settle for smaller amounts than they
would otherwise."" Considered in the context of the institutional barriers
to Japanese litigation-some particular to antitrust suits, others applicable
to all lawsuits-this paucity of lawsuits becomes less surprising. 142
134. Matsushita Denki, 863 Hanrei jih at 29.
135. See id. at 30.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Negishi, supra note 132, at 149-50, suggests that the plaintiffs might also have proven the
price at which the manufacturer sold the receivers to its buyers and then added an appropriate profit
margin to that price, but that they were unable to obtain even this information. See infra pp. 631-32
(importance of discovery).
139. Because Kai, Sate, and Matsushita Denki involved large numbers of indirect purchasers,
they probably could not have been settled before they were filed. There is no reason, however, that
direct purchasers could not settle before they file suit.
140. By contrast, over 9000 private antitrust cases were filed in the United States from 1945 to
1969. See Posner, supra note 65, at 371.
141. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 435.
142. Some of these barriers have even become the object of attention in the American popular
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A. Barriers to Antitrust Litigation
Several of the barriers illustrated by these cases are specific to antitrust
litigation. Consider, for example, the "pass-on" defense. 43 Sat-6 involved
indirect purchasers, and the crucial issue in the case became the classic
pass-on problem: whether when a product passed through a complicated
distribution channel over several months at a time when the economy as a
whole was undergoing rapid changes, the actions of the ultimate seller
resulted in the price increases to the ultimate buyer. Although also indi-
rect purchasers, the plaintiffs in Kai did not lose directly over a pass-on
issue. Yet despite the Kai court's misplaced concern over market prices,
some evidence suggests that its economic analysis was wrong and that car-
tel prices may in fact have been above market levels. 44 If so, the plain-
tiffs' inability to prove the true market price may in part have been a
function of their inability as indirect purchasers to prove the effect of in-
tervening factors like freight costs and crude oil prices. To that extent,
Kai becomes a pass-on case as well.
14 5
As one solution to the "pass on" problem, American courts have al-
press. See, e.g., Mayer, Japan: Behind the Myth of Japanese Justice, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1984, at
113.
Other deterrents exist as well, of course. Plaintiffs in Japan must pay a "stamp tax" at the time
they file suit, calculated as a percentage of the damages they assert. The percentage varies from
approximately 0.16% to 0.8%. See Minji sosh- hiyo tu ni kansuru h-ritsu [Law Concerning Civil
Litigation Costs, Etc.], Law No. 40 of 1971, §§ 4, 8, Tab. 1. An additional tax is payable upon
appeal.
The absence of offensive collateral estoppel may deter some litigation by preventing plaintiffs from
making use of prior judgments. On the absence of collateral estoppel in Japan, see Kikuchi, K-sei
Torihiki linkai kakutei shinketsu no koryoku: Minji sosh'o To no Asaku wo dirushin ni [The Binding
Power of FTC Decisions-Their Relation to Civil Litigation], 24 AOYAMA HOGAKU RONSHU 117,
124-37; Mikazuki, supra note 91, at 38; Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28, at 44. But see
Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 82-83 (prior judgment may have considerable probative value despite
absence of collateral estoppel).
The statutory authorization of cartels is arguably one of the most effective institutional barriers to
antitrust damage suits. Since 1953, the Antimonopoly Act has permitted firms in industries meeting
various requirements to fix prices by forming "depression cartels," see Antimonopoly Act, supra note
34, § 24-3, and many firms have formed cartels by obtaining other statutes specifically exempting
their industry from the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act. Cf E. HADLEY, supra note 31, at 373-81
(few cartels formed under Antimonopoly Act itself); K. YA.IAMURA, supra note 35, at 54-86 (in-
crease in number of cartels). See generally Note, supra note 33, at 1070-71 (rationalization and
depression cartels exempted from Antimonopoly Act).
143. It has apparently been clear only since Matsushita Denki that indirect purchasers could
sue-and that "passed on" costs would therefore probably be a defense. See Atsuya, Tok)"J Kosai tayu
songai baishi seik)Fa sosh-o ni tsuite [On the Tokyo High Court Kerosene Private Damage Litigation],
458 HANRE! TAIMUZU 2, 3 (1982); Negishi, supra note 132, at 146. Thus, the "pass on" issue does
not itself explain why so few parties sued prior to 1977. But see id. at 146 (ability of consumers to sue
was established scholarly position prior to Matsushita Denki).
144. Tsurumi, supra note 27, at 119-21 (oil firms conspired in early 1971 to fix prices in order
to overcome MITI's "policy of forcing the oil industry into price competition"); see J. WHEELER, M.
JANOW & T. PEPPER, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN THE 1980S, at 172 n.2
(1982); Shoda, supra note 95, at 117-18.
145. See Shoda, supra note 95, at 117-18 (noting pass-on problem in Kai).
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lowed only direct purchasers to sue, but denied the defendant the defense
that the direct purchasers have "passed on" some of the price increase to
others. 46 The American rule grants the cause of action to the parties with
the easiest access to the information necessary to maintain the suit and
permits those parties to collect not only their own damages but also the
damages suffered by those to whom they in turn sold the goods. Japanese
courts allow a larger number of plaintiffs to sue, but each plaintiff may
sue only for a smaller amount of damages and only after incurring the
larger litigation costs necessary to disprove the defendant's pass-on de-
fense. Thus, although none of the plaintiffs in Kai and Sat' could have
sued under the American rule, the American rule increases the chance
that someone will successfully sue a price-fixer, and in so doing increases
the deterrent value of private damage litigation.
Had Japanese courts wanted to allow indirect purchasers to recover
their damages, they could have taken several other approaches. The courts
could, for example, have allowed both direct and indirect purchasers to
recover the entire amount of the defendants' price increases. Had the
courts been worried about the potential double recovery such a scheme
would allow, they could have adopted a rebuttable presumption: 47 Once
the plaintiffs had proven a price-fixing agreement, the courts could have
presumed that the price-fixers had caused any subsequent price increases
up to the amount by which the defendants initially raised their prices.14 8
Even though the court rejected the use of presumptions, it could have
given more weight than it did to the FTC's opinion on damages. The
Antimonopoly Act explicitly requires that, whenever a plaintiff brings a
private damage action under the Act, the court must obtain from the FTC
an opinion on damages. 49 This requirement suggests that the drafters in-
tended the courts to give weight to the Commission's estimate,80 and the
estimate would necessarily have included a discussion of the amounts the
seller had "passed on" to the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the issue did not
arise in Matsushita Denki,161 and in Kai and Sato the court dismissed the
FTC's opinion almost out-of-hand.152
146. See supra pp. 614-15.
147. See Kikuchi, supra note 106, at 37 (advocating a presumption); Okujima, supra note 115, at
13 (same).
148. Such a presumption would be sensible if, as seems probable, a producer in Japan is more
likely than a consumer to have access to the information necessary to prove the extent to which a
retailer passes on a price increase. See Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 86; Negishi, supra note 67, at 99.
149. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, § 84.
150. See Sh-da, Dokkinh-, supra note 115, at 120.
151. The FTC stated that it was unable to issue an estimate because it had collected insufficient
information in the course of its administrative proceedings. See Matsushita Denki, 863 Hanrei jih at
30.
152. In Kai, the court rejected the FTC's estimate on the grounds that the Commission had based
its calculations on the difference between the plaintiff's prices and the pre-cartel prices. See Kai, 1005
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Kai, Sato, and Matsushita Denki also demonstrate that Japanese courts
impose an almost impossibly high standard of proof on damages in anti-
trust cases.1"3 Although slightly different factors contributed to the unreal-
istically high standard in each case, the difficulty of proof ultimately
seems to derive from the courts' unwillingness to engage in economic anal-
ysis on issues that involve fundamentally economic questions. The Kai
and Sat- courts concluded that by denominating thirty percent of kerosene
"industrial-use" and raising its price, a cartel would not affect the price of
the remaining seventy percent, even if industrial users purchased the
consumer-use product-yet elementary supply and demand analysis sug-
gests the contrary.' 54 The Kai and Matsushita Denki courts refused to
consider any estimates of damages and insisted that the plaintiffs prove
the nonexistent market price as though it were an entry in a bookkeeping
ledger.155 In fact, however, such a hypothetical price depends on supply
and demand elasticities and the plaintiffs could prove nothing but
estimates.' 56
Hanrei jiho at 78. There was simply inadequate proof, it explained, that the pre-cartel price would
have been the market price in the absence of the price-fixing agreement. Id. In Satii-which was not
brought under the Antimonopoly Act-the court declared that the FTC had simply ignored the prob-
lem of causation and had assumed that the price-fixing arrangement had raised retail prices. See Sato-,
997 Hanrei jih- at 85.
153. In fact, Japanese courts have insisted upon a more demanding standard of proof for damages
than American courts in most areas of law. See Tsubota, Myth and Truth on Non-Litigiousness in
Japan, U. CHI. L. ScH. REC., Spring 1984, at 8, 10. The problem of proof becomes especially acute,
however, when it involves the determination of a hypothetical market price.
In Japan, the primary debate over proof of damages has involved the probative value of consent
decrees and cease-and-desist orders. Several prominent scholars have argued that various types of
FTC orders should bind subsequent judicial actions. For a summary of the debate, see Kikuchi, supra
note 142; Ramseyer, supra note 79, at 421 n.181; Symposium, Dokkinh to minji sekinin [The An-
timonopoly Act and Civil Liabilityj, 4 KEIZA FOGAKKAI NENPO 83, 89-90 (1983). The courts have
consistently rejected the notion that FTC decisions should bind the courts, and rightly so. See Idemitsu
K7san, K.K. v. Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, 32 Sai-han minshu 515, 521 (Japan Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1978);
accord Kai, 1005 Hanrei jih'r at 59; Sato 997 Hanrei jih at 71; Matsushita Denki, 863 Hanrei jihT
at 27-28; Nobo Indasutorii, K.K. v. Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, 800 Hanrei jih- 35, 37 (Japan Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 28, 1975). Any other result would impose liability on defendants who have had no trial on the
factual issues, and could severely hamper the FTC's enforcement efforts by making parties far less
likely to accept consent decrees and cease-and-desist orders.
154. This assumes, of course, that the producers were able to control the quantities of the two
types of kerosene supplied.
155. See generally, Kikuchi, supra note 106, at 38-39 (difficulty of proving antitrust damages in
Japan); Negishi, supra note 132, at 149 (criticizing Matsushita Denki's standard of proof).
156. This demand for precision sharply contrasts with the American rule, under which courts
require less proof on the amount of the plaintiff's injury than on the fact that a plaintiff was injured.
See P. AREEDA, supra note 41, 159, at 78; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic
Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 343 (1974). As the Supreme
Court put it, "there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact
that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to
fix the amount." Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
"'[J]uries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof,"'
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (quoting Story Parchment Co., 282
U.S. at 564), the Court explained, because "[tihe most elementary conceptions of justice and public
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has
Barriers to Litigation in Japan
B. Barriers to Litigation Generally
Several of the barriers to litigation that inhibit antitrust suits apply
with equal force to other forms of litigation. For example, the Japanese
civil procedure code does not permit class actions."6 7 Although it allows
representative plaintiffs to litigate common issues," 8 the decision binds
only those plaintiffs who have agreed to be bound." 9 As a result, many
victims of antitrust or other violations are unable to raise the damage pool
high enough to make litigation financially worthwhile. The total damages
demanded in Sat-, for instance, were $19,000, in Matsushita Denki $860,
and in Kai $370."' In the many sectors of the economy where cartels
inflict small amounts of damages on a large number of individuals, class
action suits represent the only effective deterrent to anti-competitive
conduct.''
Japanese discovery provisions represent a further barrier to litigation,
for Japanese civil procedure provides few means of effective discovery ei-
ther before or during trial. In fact, parties often can demand the produc-
tion of documents only if they can both demonstrate that they have a sub-
stantive legal interest in the documents-as, for example, in a contract
between the parties-and point to the identities and locations of the docu-
ments.'" 2 This absence of any significant discovery creates enormous ad-
created." Id. at 265. In price-fixing cases, American courts often use the pre-cartel or post-cartel
price, adjusted for any intervening circumstances, to determine what the market price would have
been. See P. AREEDA, supra note 41, 1 159 (and cases cited therein).
157. See Kikuchi, Dokusen kinshi ho ihan koisha no minji sekinin: fo [The Civil Liability of
Antimonopoly Act Violators: Part I] 265 NBL 28, 30 (discussing implications of lack of class actions
for antitrust enforcement); Kimura & Kuboi, Waga kuni ni okeru sh-dan sosh-o no jitsujo to kadai
[The State of Group Litigation in Our Nation and the Issues Involved in Such Litigation], 671
JURiSUTo 60, 65-67 (1978); Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28, at 43.
158. See MINjI SOSHO HO § 47.
159. Matsuura, Sentei rojisha [Selected Parties], in MiNjI SOSHo HO K"6GI [LECTURES ON CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW] 60-62 (H. Kaneko & N. Koyama eds. 1970).
160. See Matsushita Denki, 863 Hanrei jiho at 21 (172,300 yen); Case Comment, 1005 Hanrei
jih-u 32, 33 (1981) (Kai: 75,081 yen); Case Comment, 997 Hanreijih- 18, 18 (1981) (Sat-o: 3,895,458
yen). In the third oil cartel private damage action, settled out of court in 1981, the plaintiffs demanded
approximately 363,000 yen. See T7yu saiban nigai wakai, supra note 67, at 23.
For a discussion of the non-financial goals of the Sato plaintiffs, see S. UEDA, SAtBAN TO MINSHU
SHUGI [LITIGATION AND DEMOCRACY] 198-213 (1979); Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 79, 88.
161. See supra note 46.
Even in the United States, however, class actions hardly represent a panacea for private law en-
forcement. The typical class attorney has a stake only in maximizing his or her fee, while the class
members have an interest in maximizing the total damage recovery. Because the class attorney is
largely unsupervised, a defendant may be able to exploit this conflict of interest to obtain a smaller
total settlement in exchange for a larger attorneys' fee. See Dam, supra note 55, at 56-61; Rosenfield,
An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 115 (1976). Even a bribe to the
plaintiff's attorney, however, is a cost to the defendant and has some deterrent effect.
162. See generally Harada, Civil Discovery Under Japanese Law, 16 L. JAPAN 21 (1983). Japa-
nese courts may, however, be becoming more liberal in ordering parties to produce documents. See id.
at 43-48; Kobayashi, Minji sosh-o no shten-Disukabari mondai o chushin ni [The Focus of Civil
Litigation-Primarily Regarding the Discovery Issue], IhoRrrsu JIHO, Nov. 1983, at 17. The power
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 604, 1985
vantages, of course, for defendants who control access to information, es-
pecially in complex economic cases like antitrust damage actions. 63
Third, the government deliberately limits the number of lawyers. With
few exceptions, one can become an attorney in Japan only by attending
the Legal Training and Research Institute in Tokyo.1 614 The government
controls the admission to this Institute, however, and has limited the num-
ber of entrants-and therefore the number of new lawyers-to about 500
annually.'65 As a result, while over 350,000 lawyers practice in the
United States, barely 11,000 practice in Japan. 66
The consequences of this policy are predictable: a shortage of lawyers
and high fee structures.167 Most attorneys in Japan have chosen to prac-
tice in the metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka.' 8 Thus, in many pro-
of the FTC to obtain evidence is also limited. See Haley, Antitrust in Japan: Problems of Enforce-
ment, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 121, 122 (J.
Haley ed. 1978).
163. See Okujima, supra note 115, at 15 (noting implications of lack of discovery for antitrust
damage actions).
164. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDFRSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 2.02[3], at 2-14 to 2-15
(1983); Abe, Education of the Legal Profession in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 11, at 153,
158; Haley, supra note 13, at 385. The exceptions to the requirement are discussed in Got'o, Bengoshi
no shikaku [The Qualifications of Lawyers], JIfu TO SEIGI, Feb. 1984, at 71.
165. See T. HATrORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, § 2.02[2], at 2-13 n.38 (in the last year
for which data were available, less than 2% of the nearly 30,000 applicants gained admission to
Institute); Haley, supra note 13, at 385-86. But see Tsubota, supra note 153, at 9 (arguing that low
pass rate on Institute entrance exam is not "deliberate government policy"). The per capita number of
applicants who sit for this bar exam equivalent is higher than the per capita number of bar exam
applicants in the United States. See Haley, supra note 13, at 385-86. Of each 500 admitted to the
Institute, approximately 150 will take public service positions as judges or prosecutors rather than
become lawyers. See Altschul, Japan's Elite Law Firms, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1984, at 6, 7.
166. See T. HATrORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, § 2.09, at 2-45 & n.159 (Japanese
figures based on 1977 data; United States figures based on 1976 data).
167. A third effect is the use of attorney-substitutes. Due to the scarcity of lawyers, attorneys in
Japan practice almost exclusively in the one area in which they have a monopoly: litigation. See
Higuchi, Bengoshi h to bengoshi gyomu [The Lawyers' Law and Lawyers' Work], JiU TO SEIGI,
Feb. 1984, at 4, 4; Tanaka, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japanese Society, in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 254, 257. For other "legal" services, Japanese generally turn to
non-lawyer specialists. Tax work may be done by tax specialists, document work by judicial and
administrative "scriveners," and patent work by patent specialists. The largest category of non-lawyer
specialists may be those who study law in college and then either fail or do not take the entrance exam
to the Legal Training and Research Institute. These are the people who will staff the law depart-
ments of the large Japanese corporations. See generally T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note
164, § 2.09 (discussing non-lawyer specialists); Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name: Legal Advisors
in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 11, at 201 (job outlines,
member profiles, and geographic distribution of non-lawyer specialists); Stevens, Multinational Cor-
porations and the Legal Profession: The Role of the Corporate Legal Department in Japan, in CUR-
RENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA, supra note 162, at 34, 35
(personnel of corporate legal departments in Japan are rarely attorneys); Tanaka, Quasi-Lawyers, in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 563-65 (description of quasi-legal jobs in Japan).
Moreover, a large percentage of litigants in Japan appear pro se. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDER-
SON, supra note 164, § 2.04 at 2-23 n.60; Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical
Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 11, at 111, 146; Tanaka, The Role of
Law and Lawyers in Japanese Society, supra, at 260.
168. See Tanase, The Urbanization of Lawyers and Its Functional Significance: Expansion in the
Range of Work Activities and Change in Social Role, 13 L. JAPAN 20, 20-21 (B. Aronson trans.
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vincial towns and cities, attorneys are simply unavailable,169 and potential
clients must incur considerable search costs to obtain representation.17
Furthermore, the shortage of lawyers necessarily raises fees above the
levels that would exist in the absence of barriers to entry in the profession.
Reliable evidence is difficult to obtain,17' but fees in Japan may be high
even by American standards. Japanese lawyers almost always use a two-
part fee structure: an intitiation fee of approximately ten percent of the
amount in controversy, paid as a nonrefundable retainer, 7  and an addi-
tional fee of about fifteen percent of the value of a successful outcome.' 73
Although this fee structure may resemble the usual American contingency
fee of 30 percent, the similarity is deceptive. The initial fec. is a percentage
of the amount claimed-the amount demanded in the plaintiff's complaint
or the value of the property at issue, rather than the amount successfully
recovered.' 4 Moreover, because the initiation fee is not contingent and
must be paid at the outset, an attorney takes a much smaller risk in ex-
change for his "cut" in the litigation and has the use of the money during
the course of the representation.'
75
Fourth, the Japanese judicial system suffers from considerable delays.
In part, these delays result from a shortage of judges. Despite the fact that
1980).
169. See Brown, supra note 167, at 273.
170. See Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 (1961) (discussing
relation betweeen scarcity and search costs).
171. Ishimura & Kaminaga, Attorneys and Cases Involving Automobile Accidents, 9 L. JAPAN 83
(1976), suggests that considerable divergence exists in fee practices among Japanese attorneys. Thus,
the following discussion should be taken in very general terms.
In comparing fee structures, one should be aware that Japanese litigants generally pay their own
fees except in tort cases-in which a successful plaintiff may recover reasonable fees as part of the
damages caused by the tort. See Saito v. Watanabe, 1092 Hanrei jih- 34 (Japan Sup. Ct., Sept. 6,
1983); Hayashi v. Uchiyama, 23 Sai-han minsh-u 441, 444-45 (Japan Sup. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969);
Harashima, Thkyo Chisai ni okeru songai baish-o gaku no jittai [Reality About Damage Awards by
the Tokyo District Court], 431 JURisTrro 235, 247-48 (1969); Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28, at
42-43.
Furthermore, one should note that some commentators have argued that a given piece of legal work
requires less time in Japan than in the United States, so that the total fees paid for a given piece of
work in Japan represent compensation for a smaller investment of time than they would in the United
States. See Tsubota, supra note 153, at 10-11. Others have claimed that the quality of legal services
provided in Japan is lower than in New York or London. See Altschul, supra note 165, at 7.
172. The percentage generally decreases as the claim increases. See J. INOKUMA, ANATA NO
HoRFISU SODAN [YOUR LEGAL CONSULTATION] 265 (1971) (5-10%); H. TANIKAWA, K. IWAKI, M.
MIYAHARA & A. SHIRASAKI, NICHIJO SEIKATSU NO HORITSU SODAN [LEGAL CONSULTATION ON
DAILY LIVING] 271 (1969) [hereinafter cited as H. TANIKAWA]; Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28,
at 42-43; Tsubota, supra note 153, at 10.
173. See J. INOKUMA, supra note 172, at 265 (10-15%); H. TANIKAWA, supra note 172, at 271;
Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 28, at 42.
174. This fee structure operates, of course, as a disincentive to exaggerating one's damages. See
Tsubota, supra note 153, at 10.
175. Cf R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 448-49 (contingent fee should compensate for loan of legal
services).
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Japan has over half the population of the United States,17 Japan has
fewer than two thousand judges of general jurisdiction,'1  in contrast to
the more than six hundred federal" 8 and six thousand state judges"' in
the United States. a8 ' Compounding the delay, Japanese civil procedure
entitles litigants to a trial de novo on appeal, complete with new evi-
dence, 8 ' and a full review of legal issues at the Supreme Court.182 As a
result, the average appealed civil case lasts more than five years, and cases
extending over seven to ten years are not unusual.18 ' Any plaintiff whose
preference for money now rather than later exceeds the interest rate used
by the court will necessarily be deterred from suing.8
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN
These institutional barriers have profoundly affected attitudes toward
litigation in Japan. The barriers do not, of course, prevent anyone who
wishes to sue from suing. They do, however, dramatically alter a potential
plaintiff's incentive to sue. Profit-maximizing victims of a cartel will assert
a claim only if the likelihood of their success multiplied by the amount of
their probable recovery exceeds the costs of asserting their claim. 85 They
176. See THE HAMMOND ALMANAC 600, 688 (M. Bacheller ed. 1980).
177. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, § 3.03, at 3-48 (1977 data; summary
court judges excluded but, because of limitations of source, family court judges included).
178. 723 F.2d vii-xxxi (1984) (Article III judges only; senior judges excluded).
179. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 190 (104th ed.
1984) (1978 data).
180. According to one study, during the 1970's a typical federal district judge had a caseload of
325 cases, a typical California superior court judge had a caseload of 964 cases, and a typical Japa-
nese trial court judge had a caseload of 1708 cases. See Haley, supra note 13, at 381.
181. See MINji SOSHo 0O §§ 360-392; T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, § 8.02.
Roughly one-fourth of the district court judgments are appealed. See id. § 8.04 n.9.
182. See MINjI SOSHo HO §§ 393 to 409-3; T. HATFORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, §
8.03. The right to appeal to the Supreme Court exists for cases begun in the district courts but not for
those begun in the summary courts. Roughly one-third of all high court judgments are appealed to the
Supreme Court. See id., § 8.03121, at 8-15 n.78.
183. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 25, 56; Tanaka, Delays in Court Proceedings, in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 475, 476-77. These data appear roughly comparable to the data on
antitrust cases in the United States-thought to be among the most protracted cases. See Posner,
supra note 65, at 377.
184. Japanese courts assess interest at the statutory rate of 5%. MINP5 §§ 404, 419; see, e.g.,
Saito v. Watanabe, 1092 Hanrei jih- 35, 36 (Japan Sup. Ct., Sept. 6, 1983) (assessing interest);
Yamada v. Keihin Ky-ku Dentetsu, K.K., 466 Hanrei taimuzu 65, 68 (Tokyo High Ct., May 11,
1982) (same).
Litigation in Japan proceeds according to the continental system of disconnected trials. See T. HAT-
TORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 164, § 7.04[2], at 7-50 to 7-51. At least in theory, this system
should not increase the amount of time between the complaint and the judgment, so long as the
number of cases and judges remains fixed. Rather, under the common law system of continuous trials,
the plaintiff will wait longer before going to trial, while under the continental system the plaintiff will
go to trial sooner but find that the actual trial takes more time. Disconnected trials should increase
delays only if time is wasted through the repetitious re-learning of cases by the personnel involved.
But see Haley, supra note 13, at 381 (form of trial in Japan aggravates delay).
185. If a successful party may recover such costs as attorneys' fees, then appropriate adjustments
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will choose to sue rather than to settle only if the difference between their
expected discounted recovery and their expenses is greater through litiga-
tion than through settlement.18 As Kai and Sat- demonstrate, the Japa-
nese rules regarding the "pass-on" defense, damages, and discovery all
reduce the likelihood of successful recovery. The lack of a treble damage
provision reduces the amount of the probable recovery from that offered
American plaintiffs."8 " The absence of class actions, the existence of a
pass-on defense, and the shortage of attorneys all raise the cost of litiga-
tion." 8' The cumulative effect of these barriers is to reduce drastically the
number of cases in which plaintiffs find it profitable to sue. Because they
make litigation a less credible threat than otherwise, these barriers also
reduce the amounts that victims will recover through settlement.
By removing virtually all financial incentives to bringing an antitrust
suit, these barriers help to perpetuate the nonlitigious ethos. Because of
the barriers, few victims of price-fixing agreements will need to choose
between the security of the orthodox nonlitigious ethos and financial
gain-for the orthodox option will almost always also be the profitable
option. As a result, the barriers help to ensure that would-be litigants live
in a world in which few people sue, a world which confirms rather than
threatens the ethos condemning litigation as selfish and un-Japanese.
Yet if the barriers to litigation shape Japanese attitudes toward litiga-
tion, their implications extend beyond this conceptual level. Economically,
the barriers to private antitrust suits have introduced the inefficiencies as-
sociated with cartels everywhere; politically, the barriers to this and other
litigation have helped to ensure the continued legitimacy of bureaucratic
rule.
A. Economic Implications
The economic costs to Japan of maintaining these institutional barriers
to private suits have been high indeed, for virtually no other deterrents to
price-fixing exist. Japan has, in other words, effectively removed almost
all disincentives to cartelization. A business executive considering fixing
prices in Japan has practically nothing to lose.
Because of the absence of private suits, Japan has in effect entrusted the
entire task of enforcing the Antimonopoly Act to the FTC."8 9 Yet perhaps
to this formula become necessary. See supra note 45. Whether a successful plaintiff under Antimono-
poly Act § 25 may recover attorneys' fees (on the ground that an antitrust violation resembles a tort)
is unclear. See supra note 171.
186. See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61, 101 (1971).
187. Although the pass-on defense does not reduce the aggregate damages recoverable, it may
reduce the amount that a given plaintiff may recover.
188. The absence of discovery may, however, reduce the cost of litigation.
189. See Kikuchi, supra note 157, at 29-30.
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due to its relative lack of support in the legislature and the rest of the
bureaucracy,' 90 the Commission can do little to carry out its task. Al.
though the Commission can initiate criminal prosecutions, that threat will
deter few entrepreneurs. Since the oil cartel criminal cases it initiated in
1974,' the Commission has failed to bring a single prosecution. 192 The
Commission does bring administrative suits to obtain consent decrees193
and cease-and-desist orders. 94 But these measures merely require a cartel
that has been discovered to disband-they do nothing to penalize price-
fixers.
The only real deterrent at the FTC's disposal is the surcharge of 0.5 to
2 percent of a firm's gross earnings from a cartel.' 95 Even this measure,
however, appears inadequate. To date, few writers have analyzed the de-
terrent value of the surcharge. No comprehensive empirical studies exist,
and because the two-percent-of-gross-revenue formula bears no consistent
relation to the profits a would-be price-fixer could earn by joining a car-
tel, no theoretical analysis is possible. What analysis there is, however,
suggests that the surcharge is generally less than the harm caused by a
cartel.' 96 In any case, the probability that a cartel would be assessed the
surcharge is very low. From the time the surcharge provision was enacted
in 1977117 to March 1983, the-FTC brought only 32 surcharge actions. 9 '
On the basis of this minimal chance of detection alone, the surcharge is
190. See E. HADLEY, supra note 31, at 445; D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN
150 (1973); Note, supra note 33, at 1066-68.
191. See supra note 65.
192. Why the FTC has brought so few criminal prosecutions is not clear. Various Japanese com-
mentators have argued that Japan has not enforced the Antimonopoly Act aggressively because cartels
in fact cause less harm in Japan than elsewhere. See, e.g., Amaya, Iva no rinri, supra note 24, at 176
(American-style Antimonopoly Act, with its prohibition of cartels, fundamentally unsuited to group-
oriented Japanese culture). This theory probably reflects a belief that "cooperative" behavior like
cartelization is well-suited to a "consensual" and "harmonious" society like Japan. See infra pp.
637-38. A more plausible reason is that some Japanese perceive price-fixing to be a relatively innocu-
ous crime for which criminal sanctions are inappropriate. But see supra p. 611 (such perception
should not be exaggerated).
The FTC may also consider criminal prosecutions to be an inefficient use of its resources. Because
of the stigma of conviction, a firm is more likely to contest a criminal prosecution than an administra-
tive action. In order to conserve its resources, the Commission may concentrate its efforts on those
actions that firms are least likely to contest vigorously. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 474-78. Note,
however, that the resources invested in the prosecution will primarily be those of the Ministry of
Justice rather than the FTC.
193. See Antimonopoly Act, supra note 34, §§ 48, 53-3.
194. See id. § 54.
195. See id. § 7-2.
196. See Okujima, supra note 115, at 7.
197. Law No. 63 of 1977.
198. The total assessed surcharge was 7,404,750,000 yen, or about $35,260,000. See 1983 K5SEI
TORIHIKI IINKAI NENJI HOKOKU [ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FTC] 21; 1982 KUSE TORIHIKI I1NKAI
NENJI HOKOKU [ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FTC] 17; Motonaga, Kach'kin seido no genjo to doko
[The Status and Direction of the Surcharge System], 751 JURIsuTo 43, 46 (1981).
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almost certainly far less than the optimal deterrent: the cartel's social
harm divided by the probability of discovery.' 99
This dearth of enforceable deterrents to price-fixing has apparently led
to exactly the consequences one would expect: a "cooperative" economy
characterized by widespread cartelization. 00 As noted earlier, cartels
transfer wealth from purchasers to sellers, increase the price of the
cartelized good above its marginal cost while decreasing its supply and
increasing the demand for its substitutes, and increase the cost of produc-
ing the cartelized good.20' Quantitative economic analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, but the data suggests that despite the remarkable
performance of the Japanese economy in many sectors, cartels have taken
their toll. "The Japanese economy has borne," as one Brookings Institu-
tion study concludes, "significant costs in the form of allocative ineffi-
ciency and diversion of rivalry into costly nonprice forms. We can detect
no corresponding gains."202
B. Political Implications
The consequences of the barriers to litigation have been not only eco-
nomic but political. By decreasing the incidence of litigation, the barriers
have helped to perpetuate the myth of Japan as a consensual and harmo-
nious society. And it is in part by that consensual myth that the bureau-
cracy has legitimated its dominant role in Japanese society.
1. The Consensual Myth and the Bureaucracy
The nonlitigious ethos in Japan is part of a larger tradition in which
Japanese individuals have perceived their society to be uniquely consen-
sual and harmonious.203 Whether Japan is in fact unusually consensual or
harmonious is not the issue here.20 4 What matters to this Article is that
199. See supra pp. 605-06.
200. See Caves & Uekusa, supra note 32, at 491-92; cf. E. HADLEY, supra note 31, at 357-89
(discussing cartels in Japan); K. YAMAMURA, supra note 35, at 39-86 (discussing historical develop-
ment of "pro-monopoly" policy).
201. See infra p. 612.
202. Caves & Uekusa, supra note 32, at 522. But see Rotwein, Economic Concentration and
Monopoly in Japan-A Second View, 36 J. ASIAN STUD. 57, 75 (1976) (Japanese cartel policy "may
contribute to mounting problems in the future," but cartels to date have often been ineffective).
203. The Japanese term for harmony is "wa," which Japanese commentators have often de-
scribed as a Japanese characteristic. See, e.g., Amaya, Wa no rinri, supra note 24, at 182 (concept of
"wa" is fundamental to understanding group-oriented character of Japanese culture); Nakamura,
Basic Features of the Legal, Political, and Economic Thought of Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND,
supra note 17, at 143, 145-48 (relating "spirit of harmony" to Japanese concept of law).
204. See Mouer & Sugimoto, Theories of Japanese Culture: Reply, 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOL-
OGY 659 (1983) (criticizing "consensus model" of Japanese society); Najita, Introduction: A Synch-
ronous Approach to the Study of Conflict in Modern Japanese History, in CONFLICr IN MODERN
JAPANESE HISTORY 3, 9 (T. Najita & J. Koschmann eds. 1982) (criticizing description of Japan as
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the Japanese see their world as one that successfully promotes those val-
ues. As one prominent MITI official wrote in 1980:
Both in the past and in the present, the fundamental social unit in
Japan has been not the atomistic individual but the molecular group.
• . . The individual experiences life as an organic member of the
group, and the fundamental ethic within the group is, whether in the
Sh-toku20 5 Cabinet or the Suzuki Cabinet, that of "harmony.) 206
This perception of harmony is crucial, for it plays a central part in legiti-
mating bureaucratic rule in Japan.
Although structured as a parliamentary democracy, modern Japan is
largely governed by an elite and fundamentally nondemocratic bureau-
cracy.20 7 The ministries rather than the legislature draft the laws and de-
termine basic national policies for the future. Contrasting the Japanese
legislature with the bureaucracy, political scientist Chalmers Johnson de-
scribes a "separation . between reigning and ruling, . . . between the
majority party and the mandarinate-and, in the last analysis, between
authority and power."208 The power of MITI and the Ministry of Fi-
nance to direct the economy is perhaps the most visible, and certainly the
most widely discussed, aspect of bureaucratic rule. Indeed, from these
ministries derives the caricature of "Japan, Inc." Yet the allocation of
political power takes place in much the same manner at local levels. As
any American who has lived in Japan for any length of time knows, local
bureaucrats can act in ways at least as intrusive as those of MITI.20 9
Moreover, the Japanese bureaucracy has largely exercised its power
without the constraints on bureaucratic discretion imposed by representa-
tive or judicial mechanisms. A ministry may consult repeatedly with an
industry it regulates, and may meet with members of the academic com-
munity or even the public. Yet the ministry itself determines with whom it
consensual); Silberman, The Bureaucratic State in Japan: The Problem of Authority and Legitimacy,
in CONFLICT IN MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY, id., at 226, 229 ("Japan's experience after 1868
embodies the major paradoxes of the modern capitalist state: centralized power along with
unruliness").
205. Shotoku Taishi served as regent to the Japanese empress from 593 to 622 A.D. See M.
HANE, JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 35 (1972).
206. Amaya, Wa no rinri, supra note 24, at 182 (translation by J.M. Ramseyer; emphasis in
original).
207. See generally D. HENDERSON, supra note 190, at 166, 195-215 (description of bureaucratic
rule; bureaucracy largely immune from judicial review); C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 22 ("deci-
sion-making is centered in . . . an elite bureaucracy" in "plan-rational" societies like Japan); John-
son, Japan: Who Governs? An Essay on Official Bureaucracy, 2 J. JAPANESE STUD. 1, 28 (1975)
(Japanese bureaucracy holds "an ascendant position").
208. C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 35.
209. See Young, supra note 79, at 931-32 (discussing administrative guidance by local govern-
ments); Hayashi, supra note 88, 1223 ToKI NO HOREi at 54.
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will consult and what it will discuss.21 To the extent the ministry com-
promises its stand on an issue, it generally does so only to obtain the
acquiesence of the industry regulated, not because of any representative
process within the bureaucratic apparatus. Nor does judicial review of bu-
reaucratic action exist to any significant extent in Japan: Japanese courts
have invoked standing, justiciability, and administrative discretion to elim-
inate most judicial review of administrative action.2 '
2. Litigation and Legitimacy
Some of the institutional barriers to litigation forthrightly protect this
bureaucratic prerogative. The various obstacles inhibiting legal challenges
to administrative action are perhaps the most obvious examples.21 ' The
Japanese class-action and discovery rules, however, also exemplify such
barriers. The class-action provisions frustrate challenges to bureaucratic
policies of the sort seen in Kai and Sat. The ineffective discovery mecha-
nisms hamper parties without access to information-more likely to be
those outside the bureaucratic and economic elite than within it.
The political implications of other institutional barriers to litigation are
less explicit, since these barriers may reduce the utility of the courts for
everyone in society and curtail all litigation, not just that posing a direct
challenge to the bureaucracy. Leading business firms can be victims of
price-fixing arrangements as often as consumers are. Yet the "pass on"
defense and the insistence on a precise proof of damages will reduce those
firms' ability to recover their losses. The shortage of judges forces the eco-
nomic elite to queue for judicial services like everyone else,213 and the
shortage of attorneys raises the price of legal services to all. Indeed, to the
210. See generally C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 47-50 (government policy panels known as
"shingikai" often have limited input, if any, while outsiders are ignored); cf. Young, supra note 79, at
938-41 (parties regulated, though not the public, may have considerable role in formulation of pol-
icy). As of 1977, representatives of consumers made up one percent of the membership of the sh-
ingikai. See Miyamoto, supra note 67, at 78.
211. See, e.g., D. HENDERSON, supra note 190, at 200-06 (vast administrative powers "are little
affected by legalities"); Lury, Japanese Administrative Practice: The Discretionary Role of the Japa-
nese Government Official, 31 Bus. LAW. 2109, 2110-21 (1976) (broad phrasing of statutes permits
nearly "free" administrative discretion); Upham, supra note 30, at 235-44 (doctrines of ripeness and
standing are major obstacles for environmental claims); F. Upham, Law and Social Conflict in Con-
temporary Japan VI: 10-22 (1984) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing doctrines of justiciability,
standing, and administrative discretion). Judicial review is further hampered by the limited nature of
the sanctions that a Japanese court may impose, see Haley, Sheathing the Sword ofJustice in Japan:
An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265 (1982), and by the limitations on the
availability of equitable relief, see Upham, supra note 30, at 226, 228-34 (difficulties of obtaining
injunctive relief in environmental cases). But see Young, supra note 79, at 958-80 (arguing that
limitations on judicial review in Japan have sometimes been exaggerated).
212. See sources cited supra note 211.
213. Judicial delays would damage the economic elite less than other members of society only if
the elite discounted money at a lower rate than the public-an unlikely proposition.
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extent law protects existing property rights, those with the most property
may have the greatest need for courts and suffer the greatest harm from
any general barriers to litigation.214
The political implications of these more broad-ranging barriers to liti-
gation are not, therefore, immmediately apparent. Instead, these implica-
tions become clear only in light of the relation between litigation and the
Japanese consensual myth. Litigation is a public and contentious exercise.
It forces parties to make clear, conflicting claims, and brings to the surface
disputes among individuals and between social groups.215 As a result, it
necessarily provides an individual with "empirical" evidence of the tenu-
ous character of the Japanese consensus. Litigation thus confronts the in-
dividual as a threat to his or her vision of Japan as a consensual society.
On the other hand, to the extent that individuals internalize the nonli-
tigious ethos-to the extent that the ethos prevents them from suing-the
ethos destroys that "empirical" evidence and helps to ensure the continued
plausibility of the consensual myth. By making it unprofitable to sue, in
other words, the institutional barriers help to perpetuate the nonlitigious
ethos; by so doing, they decrease the incidence of litigation and help to
insure the viability of the consensual myth.
This consensual myth is important because of the role it plays in legiti-
mating bureaucratic rule. Legitimacy, in the words of Frankfurt School21
theorist Jiirgen Habermas, represents "a political order's claim to be rec-
ognized as right and just. '2 17 In Japan, where legitimate authority is pre-
mised on strongly held democratic principles, a major task of a legitimat-
ing myth is to resolve, at an ideational level, the contradiction between
those democratic principles and the fact of nondemocratic bureaucratic
rule.218 The consensual myth mediates this contradiction by positing a
popular consensus which purportedly defines the contours of bureaucratic
action.2 9 The public perceives bureaucratic rule as consistent with
214. For example, Haskell, Litigation and Social Status in Seventeenth-Century New Haven, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 219, 238-39 (1978), found a strong correlation between social status and the use of the
courts. Haskell suggests "that the very nature of law ensures that high status persons appear more
often as plaintiff than as defendant." Id. at 238.
215. There is, of course, a risk to the elite in making litigation relatively unavailable. Aggrieved
parties may then take their disputes "to the streets" and make the existence of their grievances harder
to deny than if they had litigated their claims. Environmental pollution disputes in Japan, for exam-
ple, have involved a combination of litigation with such out-of-court demonstrations. See Upham,
Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution
Suits, 10 L. & Soc'Y REv. 579 (1976).
216. See generally T. BoTTOMORE, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (1984) (overview of the Frankfurt
School).
217. J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (T. McCarthy
trans. 1979).
218. Cf. M. URBAN, THE IDEOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATION 5 (1982) (ideology mediates at sym-
bolic level between democratic norms and class structure).
219. Indeed, some Japanese courts have even determined the propriety of government actions by
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democratic principles, in other words, because it perceives that rule as
directed and constrained by a broadly based consensus on major issues.
In thus reconciling the existing allocation of power with the dominant
political metaphysic, the consensual myth reduces the extent to which in-
dividuals feel estranged from the state. Minimizing that subjective aliena-
tion is crucial to maintaining the stability of the state. As anthropologist
Clifford Geertz explains, if "a state [is] to do more than administer privi-
lege and defend itself against its own population, its acts must seem con-
tinuous with the selves of those whose state it pretends it is, its citi-
zens-to be, in some stepped-up, amplified sense, their acts. ' '220 The
consensual myth reduces the estrangement of the individual from the state
by enabling individuals to see themselves as governed in a manner consis-
tent with their democratic values; the myth accomplishes this by enabling
them to see themselves as part of a society characterized by a broad-
ranging consensus and governed by a bureaucracy guided by that consen-
sus. Through the consensual myth, in short, individuals perceive that bu-
reaucracy as their bureaucracy. The consensual myth creates, in Geertz's
words, "a collective subject to whom the actions of the state can be inter-
nally connected, . . an experiential 'we' from whose will the activities of
government seem spontaneously to flow."
22 1
To the extent that belief in the consensual myth remains plausible, the
Japanese bureaucracy can claim, by virtue of its rationality and expertise,
to be the instrument best able to implement that consensus.2 22 In terms of
rationality, the Japanese upper civil service resembles the archetype of
Max Weber's efficient bureaucracy: an institution "superior to any other
form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its
reliability. '223 In terms of intellectual ability, the upper civil servants in
Japan have few equals. MITI and the Ministry of Finance consistently
recruit the brightest graduates of the most highly regarded universities in
Japan, and promote within their ranks only the most outstanding
individuals.224
discussing whether the actions accorded with a societal consensus, see Young, supra note 79, at
966-68.
220. C. GEERTZ, supra note 9, at 317 (italics in original).
221. Id. at 240.
222. Cf Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276, 1282-83
(1984) (expertise and professionalism often accepted as justification for bureaucratic discretion);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975)
(given ascertainable goals, expertise solves problem of administrative discretion).
223. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (A. Henderson
& T. Parsons trans. 1947). See J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SocIETY 82-83 (J. Shapiro
trans. 1971) (bureaucracy rationalizes conditions of life); M. URBAN, supra note 218, at 24-25 (dis-
cussing "cult of expertise").
224. See, e.g., C. JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 39, 57-66 (entrance into and promotion within the
ministries largely dependent on competitive performance on "incredibly competitive" examinations);
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Nevertheless, the bureaucracy's claim that its legitimacy derives from
the public consensus depends on the continuing existence of a widely
shared vision of the commonweal-a collective vision that remains ostensi-
bly independent of the bureaucracy and determines the boundaries of
bureaucratic activity. In a world perceived as pluralistic, the bureaucracy
can point to no consensus that it can claim to implement and by which it
can claim to be restrained; in a pluralistic world, MITI can articulate no
consensus to justify its practice of independently determining the content
of national goals and the means by which it will pursue them. Legitimat-
ing bureaucratic domination would instead need to depend on alternative
myths.
In the absence of a consensual myth, alternative legitimating models
would probably involve either an increased legislative role or a new mode
of bureaucratic decisionmaking.225 Thus, the Japanese Diet might become
the arbiter of the public interest. Because the Diet formally represents the
locus of popular sovereignty, its decisions, if made according to democratic
procedures, acquire legitimacy sui generis. In providing the boundaries of
bureaucratjc action, those legislative decisions, because themselves legiti-
mate, would in turn legitimate bureaucratic action. The bureaucracy
could also acquire legitimacy by introducing representational mechanisms
into the bureaucratic apparatus itself. As in the "interest-balancing"
model of American administrative law,22 the Japanese bureaucracy
would grant to various "interest groups" the right to participate in the
processes by which it determines and implements policy.227 The arguably
democratic character of this decisionmaking process would thereby legiti-
mate bureaucratic action.
Under either an increased legislative role or the interest-balancing
model, however, bureaucratic discretion necessarily contracts. Under
E. VOGEL, supra note 2, at 54-61 ("Leading bureaucrats invariably have attended the best universi-
ties and have risen through the ranks in a carefully prescribed fashion."); see also Silberman, supra
note 204, at 251-53 (bureaucratic authority based on "monopoly over expertise"); cf Smith, "Merit"
as Ideology in the Tokugawa Period, in ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN JAPAN 71 (R.
Dore ed. 1967) (discussing relation between bureaucratic legitimacy and meritocratic ideology in pre-
modem Japan).
225. In addition, of course, modern bureaucracies may claim to be repositories of a value-free
expertise that itself establishes the parameters of bureaucratic action. "[T]he concept of managerial
effectiveness functions as a moral fiction," Alasdair MacIntyre writes, for "[b]elief in managerial
expertise is . . . very like what belief in God was thought to be by Carnap and Ayer[,] . . . the
illusion of a power not ourselves that claims to make for righteousness." A. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE 76, 107 (2d ed. 1984) (italics omitted).
226. See generally Stewart, supra note 222, at 1723-90 (developing model of "interest representa-
tion"). This would represent a greatly expanded role for the shingikai, see supra note 210.
227. Cf Frug, supra note 222, at 1283-84 (discussing claim that "either interest-group politics or
market forces intervene to discipline bureaucratic management"). This process, of course, is known in
sociological circles as "co-optation." See Selznick, Foundations of the Theory of Organization, 13 Am.
Soc. REV. 25, 34-35 (1948).
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either formula, parties outside of the bureaucracy acquire a role in the
process by which national policy is determined. In effect, the focus of le-
gitimation shifts from a teleological argument to a procedural one. Bu-
reaucratic power becomes legitimate not because it promotes the goals em-
bodied in a mythical and indefinitely malleable consensus, but because of
the concrete manner in which the legislature or the bureaucracy deter-
mines the course of bureaucratic action.228
At present, the Japanese bureaucracy has no access to such alternate
legitimating models. In large part, the Japanese bureaucracy continues to
determine policy independently of the Diet and without making use of
representational mechanisms. Bereft of the consensual myth, the Japanese
bureaucracy would be deprived of a primary means of reconciling bureau-
cratic rule with democratic principles. Only in this context does the full
importance of the barriers to litigation become clear. By discouraging liti-
gation and preserving the nonlitigious ethos, the barriers help to perpetu-
ate the consensual myth. Only through that consensual myth is the Japa-
nese democratic ideology reconciled with the existing distribution of
power;229 only through that reconciliation do individuals perceive the Jap-
anese state as their state; and only through that subjective identification
with the state do individuals perceive the status quo as legitimate.
V. CONCLUSION
The institutional barriers to litigation in Japan have, it appears, all but
eliminated private antitrust damage suits. The Japanese have paid dearly
for this, for the dearth of private antitrust litigation has removed all effec-
tive deterrents to price-fixing. If the economic consequences of the barriers
have been severe, the political consequences have been no less far-
reaching. Litigation is relatively scarce in Japan, and that scarcity is due
both to institutional barriers to litigation and to a nonlitigious ethos per-
petuated in part by those barriers. In turn, however, the scarcity of litiga-
tion has helped to make plausible the myth of Japan as a consensual and
harmonious society, and that consensual myth has played a central part in
legitimating the present form of bureaucratic domination.
The current obsession with the concept of "culture" has been mislead-
ing primarily because most observers of Japanese law have tended to di-
vorce culture from the structure of Japanese society and the individuals
who live within it. As "an ordered system of meaning and of symbols, '230
228. Cf. Kelly, Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship?, DAEDALUS, Fall 1979, at 21, 25 (contrasting
"telocratic" (purpose-governed) and "nomocratic" (rule-governed) legitimations).
229. See C. GEERTZ, supra note 9, at 332 (legitimation is the "reconciliation of [the] political
metaphysic with the actual distribution of power").
230. Id. at 144.
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however, culture both reflects social structures and is reflected in them.
Japanese find their culture compelling because the social structures within
which they live help to ensure that they behave according to cultural
norms; they find those structures legitimate because of the explana-
tory-and justificatory-power of their culture. As Americans tirelessly
point out, one cannot understand structures like the Japanese legal system
without understanding the culture which explains why these structures
are as they are. Yet neither can one understand components of that cul-
ture, like attitudes toward the legal system, without examining the institu-
tional arrangements that help to perpetuate that culture.
In effect, the current discussion of culture fails to relate the concept of
culture to the subjective calculus by which individual Japanese make deci-
sions. To say that Japanese behave the way they do because of their cul-
ture ignores the process by which culture is transformed into action. An
individual's culture provides him or her with psychic rewards for con-
forming his or her behavior to cultural norms and with psychic costs for
doing otherwise, and this psychic calculus takes on a social dimension
through communal action: acceptance and praise for appropriate behavior,
rejection and scorn for any deviation.
An individual will, of course, weigh these culturally determined re-
wards and costs in deciding what to do in a given situation. Yet he or she
will also consider other factors, for the structures of a society will provide
the individual with a set of rewards and costs independent of the cultural
calculus. Cultural norms may indicate, for example, that it is wrong to
pick pockets or wrong to sue. Yet, if few pickpockets are punished or if
many plaintiffs collect larger amounts through litigation than they could
through settlement, individuals will find it financially profitable to violate
those norms. Such a divergence between the cultural and structural calculi
will be inherently unstable.23' If structural rewards are high enough to
induce large numbers of people to violate cultural norms, the rest of soci-
ety will begin either to perceive such behavior as acceptable or to modify
those structures and remove the rewards for engaging in the culturally
unacceptable behavior. That instability, however, is in large part absent
from the Japanese legal world. For there is, in Japan, an essential con-
gruence between the cultural and structural calculi regarding litigation: If
it is wrong and un-Japanese to sue, it is also unprofitable.
Unfortunately, too many Americans have remained oblivious to Japa-
nese social structures and the subjective calculi of individual Japanese.
Too many commentators on Japanese law have done little more than re-
peat various truisms on culture-praising the nonlitigious ethos without
231. See id. at 142-46.
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asking why it persists and accepting the consensual myth without examin-
ing the role it plays in the allocation of wealth and power in Japanese
society. Culture, it seems, has become an analytical "Serbonian bog...
where [scholars] whole have sunk."2" 2
There has been, moreover, an ingenuous gullibility in much of this
American analysis. Many observers of the modern Japanese legal world
have returned from their excursions and done little more than describe a
harmonious society united behind economic growth, a world where indi-
viduals live for the group, a country that sacrifices private gain for the
commonweal. Whatever some Japanese commentators may say, however,
surely the acquiescence of powerless groups is not necessarily evidence of
"consensus, ' ' 3 just as the absence of litigation is not evidence of "har-
mony." One simply cannot take such popular Japanese explanations at
face value, for comparative law is instead a bit like a good Hitchcock:
Things are rarely what they are perceived to be. The task of comparative
law is not merely to describe these widely held perceptions, but to look
behind them, to explore the ways in which those perceptions themselves
shape the worlds of which they are a part. For even if the popular Japa-
nese myths about their polity do not accurately describe Japan, they al-
ways tell us how the Japanese perceive Japan. And ultimately, these pop-
ular Japanese myths may themselves shape the Japanese economic and
political order.
232. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST Book II, 11. 592-94 (S. Elledge ed. 1975) (2d rev. ed. London
1674).
233. See J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPA-
LACHIAN VALLEY 4 (1980) ("[Iln situations of inequality, the political response of the deprived group
or class may be seen as a function of power relationships, such that power serves for the development
and maintenance of the quiescence of the non-elite.").
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